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Non-traditional military missions have become a topical issue in the United 
States since the end of the Cold War and are an important concern for the All- 
Volunteer Force. Many feel that military involvement in activities such as disaster 
relief, civil-military programs, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping is 
revolutionary, inappropriate, and contrary to the central purpose of the armed 
forces. However, American military forces have participated in non-traditional 
missions throughout the country's history. These missions have been a vital part 
of military service as the focus of the military changed along with the nation. This 
thesis defines non-traditional missions and reviews U.S. military participation over 
three periods: 1776 to 1973, when America's involvement in the Vietnam war 
ended and the All-Volunteer Force was initiated; 1973 until the end of the Cold 
War in 1989; and 1989 to the present. This sets the stage for a detailed evaluation 
of the reasons for and against continued involvement in non-traditional missions. 
Recommendations balancing the military's legacy of non-traditional missions with 
current needs and constraints are offered to suggest a course for the future. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
"Non-traditional" missions of the United States military- 
are an important topical issue. In the past few years, this 
term has been the center of a large, extremely-polarized, and 
ongoing debate. One can hardly pick up a newspaper these days 
without finding some mention of such actions and their effects 
on the armed services and the nation. As an example, just as 
this paper was in its final stages, America was stunned by the 
tragic bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. In 
searching for possible solutions to prevent further incidents, 
the White House suggested an increased domestic anti-terrorism 
role for the military. The ensuing controversy was not 
limited by political party affiliations or normal partisan 
politics. (Baltimore Sun. 1995; Peters, 1995) 
A.   DEFINING NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS 
Before this discussion goes any further it is necessary 
to define non-traditional missions. This is not a simple task 
because of the wide variety of existing ideas. Additional 
phrases in use include "operations other than war," "peacetime 
contingency operations," and "alternative," "noncombat," 
"secondary," "supporting," or "other" missions. However, as 
a starting point, many feel that the traditional mission of 
the American armed forces is to "fight and win the nation's 
wars." (Summers, 1993, p. 69) Given this, the simplified 
definition of non-traditional missions is every other mission 
the military does that is not directed toward the preparation 
for, or engagement in, warfighting. These missions include 
disaster relief, peacekeeping and other peace operations, 
humanitarian assistance, serving as an agent of social change, 
civil-military coordination and assistance, evacuation of 
noncombatants, drug and migrant interdiction, law enforcement 
and civil disturbance assistance, blockades and no-fly zones 
to enforce economic and other sanctions, and humanitarian 
demining, to name a few. 
B. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
The most important guestion surrounding the non- 
traditional mission issue, and the ultimate focus of this 
thesis, is whether or not the military should be involved in 
non-traditional missions. To set a proper background context 
for discussion, the history of non-traditional missions in the 
U.S. military must be examined. Although the relative 
importance of non-traditional missions has only come to light 
because of the end of the Cold War, American armed forces have 
participated in them since shortly after the birth of the 
nation. 
An interesting sidelight to the principal area of 
discussion is the changing focus of the U.S. military. As 
America has grown and continued to evolve, the armed forces 
have adjusted their missions accordingly. It goes without 
saying that the relative importance and nature of non- 
traditional military missions has changed over time as well. 
These "phases" of the military, to use the terminology of 
Samuel Huntington, and their affect on both traditional and 
non-traditional missions will be highlighted and examined 
throughout the paper. 
C. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II discusses this idea of phases and changing 
military focus in greater detail. The names, lengths of time, 
and natures of the different periods are discussed. This 
chapter also offers an overview of U.S. military involvement 
in non-traditional missions from 1776 until 1973 to illustrate 
the breadth and importance of these contributions to the 
country. 
The year 1973 was used as a cutoff point for chapter II 
because it marked the start of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) 
in the American military. Not to be confused with the 
previously mentioned phases, the AVF, along with the Total 
Force concept, represents the modern structure and 
organization of the U.S. armed forces. Chapter III examines 
the non-traditional mission performance of the AVF in this 
more recent time period from 1973 until 1989. These actions 
are presented in more detail because of the added bearing on 
the discussion of these more recent events. 
Chapter IV covers the period from 1989 until the present. 
The year 1989 is used by many to mark the end of the Cold War. 
It also signified the beginning of the most recent military 
phase and brought the issue of non-traditional missions into 
sharp focus. In addition to looking at actions taken by the 
military during this period, this chapter also shows non- 
traditional mission programs that have been implemented since 
1989 and current proposals for future activities. 
The groundwork laid in the previous chapters serves in 
Chapter V as the basis for analysis of the different factors 
affecting the current debate on non-traditional missions. The 
impact of service-wide and individual soldier philosophies, a 
changing concept of national security, and readiness and 
budgetary issues are explored. The relevance of the United 
States Coast Guard as a military service traditionally tasked 
with non-traditional missions is also examined. Additionally, 
the recent history of the formal roles and mission debate and 
the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces 
(1995) are set forth. The report of this commission could 
have long-term ramifications for service participation in non- 
traditional missions. Finally, this chapter illustrates signs 
of recent change in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
individual services with respect to these missions. 
Conclusions are reached in Chapter VI in an effort to 
pull together the histories and current issues to show what 
the "big picture" of non-traditional missions looks like. 
Recommendations for necessary elements of future non- 
traditional mission action are provided along with final 
commentary on the author's position. 
D.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
An inductive research methodology was used in this 
thesis. The initial aim was to gather data on historical 
performance of non-traditional missions in the U.S. military 
and then generate trends from analyzing this data. Archival 
research served as the principal tool in this effort. The 
Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School was a 
good source for early military history volumes. 
Although non-traditional missions are now an important 
issue and the subject of much documentation, this was not 
always true. With the exception of the National Guard, who 
pride themselves on their tradition of conducting non- 
traditional missions, discussions of military involvement in 
these missions were not usually addressed directly. However, 
government documents such as Congressional hearings and 
Government Accounting Office reports provided information on 
more recent armed forces participation. Advanced military 
school academic research papers also shed light on thoughts 
about the future direction of armed service missions. 
Additionally, military history and public affairs offices, 
principally from the Air Force, Army, and National Guard, 
furnished good secondary source data for the operational 
activities of their respective branch of the armed forces. 
Telephone interviews with defense agency personnel also 
provided data for this paper. 
After the archival data were collected, analytical 
research was conducted to determine lessons learned. Results 
from this phase were used to develop recommendations on the 
non-traditional mission issues. 
E.   LIMITATIONS 
While attempting to examine a broad topic in considerable 
detail, the author holds no illusions about all-inclusive 
coverage of the issues at hand. The historical data were 
presented in a manner to highlight the long and extensive 
legacy of non-traditional missions, not to document the 
history in its entirety. Likewise, the illustrations in 
Chapters V and VI of the different facets of the present non- 
traditional missions argument attempt to present an in-depth 
picture of the various viewpoints, but are not exhaustive 
treatments of these concerns. Each one of these categories, 
such as the relationship between non-traditional missions and 
military readiness or the defense budget, could conceivably 
support an entire thesis. Still, it is hoped that this thesis 
offers a well-balanced account of past and present non- 
traditional missions and proposals along with well-supported 
recommendations for the future of non-traditional missions in 
the U.S. military. 

II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW:  1776-1973 
A.   PHASES  OF  NATIONAL  INTEREST  AND  AMERICAN  MILITARY 
MISSIONS 
Changing American national interests have resulted in 
corresponding shifts in the nature of American armed force's 
missions. According to Samuel Huntington, these "shifts" in 
interest have occurred in 1784, 1815, 1898, 1946, and 
following the end of the Cold War (Huntington, 1993, p. 38). 
Huntington's five phases, or shifts, are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Major Mission Shifts in U.S. Military, 1776-1995 
Beginning of Shift      Focus of Missions 
1784 Securing Independence 
1815 Westward Expansion, Exploration 
1898 "Big War" Military for New World Power 
1946 Winning the Cold War 
1989 ??? 
Source: Adapted from Samuel Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old 
Roles," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, p. 38. 
The armed forces of the United States have also been 
involved in the performance of non-traditional missions since 
almost the beginning of the republic. The nature of these 
non-traditional military missions have mirrored America's 
changing needs as well. This chapter chronicles some of the 
numerous examples of these missions from the earliest days of 
the nation until the start of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973. 
The information is presented in sections divided by 
Huntington's aforementioned phases to illustrate the evolution 
over time.   While this body of evidence is hardly all- 
inclusive, it is a representative sampling that serves to 
illustrate a rich and important history of military- 
contributions. See Table 2 below for a summary chronology of 
non-traditional missions and the U.S. military in this period. 
B.   SECURING INDEPENDENCE; 1784-1815 
The first shift took place during the early days after 
the Revolutionary War, when the nation needed a military to 
deal with the threats of Europe (Huntington, 1993) and to 
deter internal strife as the union consolidated (Matloff, 
1969) . Perhaps, the earliest non-traditional mission was in 
late 1786, when militia were used to break up an attack on the 
Springfield arsenal by rebels led by Daniel Shays. Shays' 
Rebellion occurred in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War 
as the nation was struggling to forge the union. (Hassler, 
1982) 
Another early example of the use of the military in 
suppressing insurrection revolved around the Whiskey Rebellion 
in 1794. This show of force was the first time the President 
had used his authority to employ troops to execute 
Congressional laws. (Matloff, 1969) 
As westward expansion began, new settlers demanded 
protection against the Indian threat in exchange for their 
continued loyalty. Their demands contained a warning that 
they might turn to England or Spain for assistance if the 
government were unable to meet their needs (Matloff, 1969). 
During this same period, the size of the U.S. was greatly 
increased through Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase in 1803. The 
military was highly involved in exploring the new territories. 
Between 1804 and 1806, Captain Meriwether Lewis and 
William Clark (a former lieutenant in the Army) conducted 
their famed expedition across the Rocky Mountains and west to 
the Pacific Ocean.  Their efforts located sites for forts to 
Table 2.  Summary Chronology of Non-Traditional Missions 
in U.S. Military, 1784-1973 
Year Non-Traditional Mission 
1786 Shay's Rebellion - Civil Insurrection 
1794 Whiskey Rebellion - Civil Insurrection 
1804-06 Lewis & Clark Expedition - Exploration 
1806-07 Capt. Zebulon Pike - Exploration of West 
1815-40S Westward Exploration 
1820s Surgeon General Lovell - Weather Studies 
1830s Capt. Bonneville - Pacific Coast Exploration 
1838-42 Lt. Wilkes - Pacific Ocean Exploration 
1840s Mapping of West; Railroad Route Surveys 
1842-50S Matthew Fontaine Maury - Naval Observatory 
1852 Commodore Perry - Japan Expedition; Diplomacy 
1850s Navy - Exploration/Survey of Pacific & World 
1860s Union School for Negroes during Civil War 
1860s-70s Reconstruction - Army Administration of South 
1867-72 King Survey - Geological Survey/Exploration 
1867-77 Alaska - Army Government & Exploration 
1870-91 Army Signal Corps - 1st Weather Service 
1870s-on Army Corps of Engineers - River/Harbor Work 
1871 Chicago Fire - Disaster Relief 
1871-79 Wheeler Survey - Geological Exploration 
1870s-90s Containment of Civil Unrest 
1880s-90s Supervision/Construction of Public Buildings 
1894 Pullman Railway - Civil Unrest 
1900-38 Boxer Rebellion & Multi-National Garrison 
1906 San Francisco Earthguake - Disaster Relief 
1907-1914 Supervised Construction of Panama Canal 
1907-1914 Found Controls for Malaria & Yellow Fever 
1916 Mexican Civil Uprisings - Border Patrol 
1919-30s First Aviation Support for Disaster Relief 
1932 Bonus March Incident - Civil Unrest 
1930s Army Support for Various Disaster Relief 
1933-42 Civilian Conservation Corps - Youth Program 
1934 Army Air Corps - Air Mail Delivery 
1948-49 Berlin Airlift - Humanitarian Assistance 
1948-on UNTSO - Middle East Peacekeeping 
1949-on Mutual Defense Assistance Program 
1950s Integration of Blacks into Services 
1954 Vietnam - Humanitarian Assistance 
1956 Suez Canal - Noncombatant Evacuation 
1958 Lebanon Rebellion - Peace Operations 
1957-68 U.S. Racial Protests/Rioting - Civil Unrest 
1960s-on Foreign Disaster Relief/Humanitarian Aid 
1965 Dominican Republic Rebellion - Peace Ops 
1967-71 Vietnam War Protests - Civil Unrest 
1970 Postal Mail Strike - Striker Replacement  
protect settlers and allow trade with the Indians, and 
resulted in a large wealth of scientific and geographic 
information about the new lands. In the years 1806-1807, 
Captain Zebulon Pike led similar expeditions along the 
Mississippi, Arkansas, and Red rivers. (Hassler, 1982) 
As the independence of the U.S. became more secure, national 
interests focused on the West. 
C.   WESTWARD EXPANSION AND EXPLORATION; 1815-1898 
The second shift started around 1815 and could be termed 
the westward expansion phase. During this period, the Army 
was used for fighting Indians and the Navy for protecting 
trade (Huntington, 1993). The military and the nation were 
involved in exploring, controlling, and governing the 
unexplored lands. Considerable time and effort were also 
expended in examining the world beyond the country's 
continental boundaries. 
Following the end of the War of 1812, exploration and 
military involvement intensified. During the next three 
decades, more settlers moved west and the Army went before 
them, "surveying , fortifying, and building roads." (Matloff, 
1969, p. 157) While exploration continued with efforts such 
as Captain Benjamin L.E. Bonneville's exploration of the 
Pacific Coast in the 1830s, much of the military effort was 
aimed at making treaties with the Indians and protecting 
settlers and trade caravans. (Matloff, 1969) 
As a sidelight to these types of non-traditional military 
efforts, the Army also contributed to meteorological research. 
Joseph Lovell, the first commissioned Surgeon General, 
required daily weather reports from all of his medical 
officers for his attempts to link weather with army diseases. 
These reports provided the basis for the first study of 
weather in America. (Matloff, 1969) 
10 
During this period, the U.S. Navy often played a part in 
diplomatic, commerce-building, and scientific research 
missions. Naval officers or ships were involved in efforts to 
sign treaties or pacts with Venezuela, Turkey, Cochin China 
(Vietnam), Siam (Thailand), and Muscat. From 1838-1842, 
Lieutenant Charles Wilkes led an expedition through the 
Pacific Ocean that included exploration of Antarctica; the 
Society, Tuamotu, and Fiji archipelagos; Samoa; the Pacific 
Northwest; and the Phillipines islands. This survey resulted 
in a wealth of scientific information that led to the 
publishing of 24 volumes of material as well as extensive 
navigational chart information. (Hagan, 1984) 
In the 1840s, victory in the war with Mexico allowed the 
nation to expand further westward. The Army's Corps of 
Topological Engineers played a major role in the exploration 
and mapping of the newly acguired land. While additional 
forts and roads were built, perhaps the most important 
contribution during this period was the location of routes for 
transcontinental railroads. (Matloff, 1969) 
Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury used his post as 
director of the Naval Observatory to foster breakthroughs in 
the fields of meteorology, hydrography, and maritime 
technology. He put together the first study in modern 
oceanography and was an advisor in the positioning of the 
first transatlantic cable. (Hagan, 1984) 
In 1852, Commodore Matthew C. Perry led an expedition to 
Japan in an effort to facilitate trade and access. Other 
survey areas in this decade included the Kurile and Aleutian 
islands, the Rio de la Plata, western coast of Africa, River 
Jordan, and the Dead Sea. (Hagan, 1984) 
During the nation's Civil War, the Union Army became a 
"school for Negroes." (Eitelberg 1989, p. 4) An estimated 
200,000 freedmen and black soldiers were provided basic 
educational skills by a combination of civilians, chaplains, 
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Army officers, officer's wives, and enlisted men. Some regard 
the system developed for this educational effort as a 
precedent for later schools. (Eitelberg, 1989) 
Following the end of the Civil War, the Army became 
involved in governing occupied areas of the South during the 
Reconstruction period. The military helped to protect blacks 
and their white supporters and aided federal marshals in 
efforts to combat the Ku Klux Klan. The armed forces were 
also used throughout the nation in domestic disturbances such 
as strikes, enforcement of local laws, and collection of 
revenues. A prime example was the Pullman (railway) strike of 
1894 where 2,000 troops were used, under Presidential order, 
to break up a strike. (Matloff, 1969) 
During the post-Civil War years, the military was also 
involved in a number of other domestic activities. After the 
purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, the Army was 
responsible for most aspects of governing Alaska for ten 
years. The Army also conducted meteorological observations 
and supported exploration of Alaska. In the continental U.S., 
the Army Signal Corps organized and operated the nation's 
first modern weather service between 1870 and 1891 (Matloff, 
1969). The armed forces assisted in controlling the Chicago 
Fire of 1871 in one of the earliest instances of military 
participation in major domestic disaster relief (Stoll, 1994) . 
The Corps of Engineers conducted work on the nation's 
rivers and harbors to develop water resources. They were 
involved in the construction of public buildings such as the 
Washington Monument, the building that became the Library of 
Congress, and the State, War, and Navy buildings (Matloff, 
1969) . Work was also done on the aqueduct and Capitol 
building in Washington, D.C. (Hassler, 1982). Additionally, 
the Corps of Engineers were responsible for both the King and 
Wheeler Surveys, which provided much scientific information 
about the lands along the 40th parallel and west of the 100th 
12 
meridian, respectively (Matloff, 1969). During the latter 
part of this expansion and exploration period, the U.S. began 
to emerge as a world power. (Matloff, 19 69) 
D.   A MILITARY FOR A NEW WORLD POWER; 1898-19 4 6 
The third shift commenced in approximately 1898, in step 
with growing U.S. industrialization and rising prominence on 
the world scene. America began to build a military suited for 
"big battles" and "big wars" (Huntington, 1993, p. 38). This 
phase involved protection of U.S. interests around the world 
and continued through the two world wars (Matloff, 1969). 
A number of Navy-led interoceanic canal surveys were 
conducted as the nation's interests expanded further beyond 
its land borders (Hagan, 1984). After participation in a 
multi-national force in 1900 to end China's Boxer Rebellion, 
American troops remained in China until 1938 to provide a 
garrison for the Tientsin-Peking railway. The Army was called 
upon to supervise the building of the Panama Canal (1907-1914) 
after the congressionally-appointed Isthmian Canal Commission 
told the President that a project of such magnitude was beyond 
the capabilities of private U.S. industry. During the 
construction of the canal, the Army Medical Department was 
instrumental in finding controls for malaria and yellow fever. 
(Matloff, 1969) 
In the aftermath of the great San Francisco earthguake of 
1906, the Army initially provided troops to guard the banking 
district, prevent looting, and assist in putting out the 
massive fires. The Army also provided food, clothing, and 
shelter to many. Eleven days after the earthguake had struck, 
the Army was placed in charge of the entire relief effort. 
For the next month and a half, military personnel built 
temporary barracks, administered refugee camps, and provided 
medical care, food, and sanitation for a city where the 
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devastation was so great that more than 350,000 people were 
homeless. (Harrison, 1992) 
In 1916, 75,000 National Guardsmen were called into 
federal service by President Wilson to help guard the 
U.S./Mexican border during Mexican civil uprisings led by 
Pancho Villa. Following the end of World War I, active Army 
troops were again used to help police the Mexican border 
because of revolutionary activity in Mexico. Around this 
time, Army personnel also helped quiet domestic disturbances 
in the U.S. brought about by labor and race-related problems. 
(Matloff, 1969) 
In 1919, the nation's military aviation services first 
became involved in non-traditional missions as food and 
supplies were air-dropped to flood victims in Texas. Flood 
relief missions were later flown in Ohio and Colorado as well. 
Army pilots also flew fire-watch missions for the U.S. Forest 
Service, conducted mapping missions for the U.S. Coast and 
Geodetic Survey, utilized bombs to break ice on the Delaware 
and Platte Rivers, and airlifted rescue workers to mine 
disasters in Colorado and California. (Callander, 1993) 
Amidst the backdrop of the Great Depression, the Army 
helped break up a gathering in Washington D.C. during 1932's 
Bonus March incident. Eleven-thousand service veterans and 
their families had grouped in front of the Capitol and in a 
nearby shantytown while demanding payment for service in World 
War I. While the Army performed this task well, the use of 
the military against civilians and veterans served to soil the 
service's image. Nevertheless, the Army was utilized in "a 
variety of nonmilitary tasks that only [they] had the 
resources and the organization to tackle quickly." (Matloff, 
1969, p. 413) These tasks included assistance in the 
aftermath of blizzards, floods, and hurricanes. The Corps of 
Engineers also increased their work on waterways to improve 
navigation and flood control. (Matloff, 1969) 
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An enormous non-traditional undertaking in this era was 
military responsibility for administration of the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC). President Roosevelt directed the 
Departments of War, Labor, Agriculture, and the Interior to 
conduct a program that put jobless young men into conservation 
work such as reforestation. The Army was responsible for 
rapid mobilization of the project and also managed the camps 
and provided for CCC enrollee welfare. In an effort that 
lasted from early 1933 until June 1942, the Army first 
utilized regular troops and later reserves to manage and train 
approximately three million American men. The CCC was viewed 
favorably by the public and regarded as a landmark social 
action success that influenced youth employment measures years 
later. (Sherraden, 1981) 
In 1934, the Army Air Corps carried air mail for three 
months while suspected fraudulent commercial contracts were 
renegotiated. This effort was eventually labeled a "fiasco" 
because of high operating costs and losses of men and 
equipment. However, it may have led to higher budgets and 
better instrument training for military pilots at the time, 
and it stands as an interesting example of military 
involvement in a non-traditional activity. (Callander, 1993) 
E.   THE COLD WAR; 1946-1973 
The next shift occurred about 1946 with the beginning of 
the Cold War (Huntington, 1993) . America and the Soviet Union 
survived World War II as the world's two remaining 
superpowers. As each developed more and more powerful nuclear 
weapons, U.S. policy was aimed at containing Soviet expansion. 
Military forces of the U.S. were built and maintained with the 
capability to wage both conventional and nuclear war while 
striving to promote democracy worldwide. 
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An early manifestation of the Cold War was the Soviet 
move in 1948 to cut off West Berlin from the rest of Germany 
occupied by the Western allies. In response, the U.S. Air 
Force provided the majority of the support for what became 
known as the »Berlin Airlift." The resupply operation lasted 
over a year and involved almost 278,000 flights to bring more 
than two million pounds of food, fuel, and other goods into 
West Berlin. (Callander, 1993) 
Also in 1948, the United Nations established the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to supervise a 
cease-fire between Israel and neighboring Arab nations (Evans, 
1987). U.S. personnel served, and continue to serve, in this 
operation, which could be described as a precursor for the 
more recent American involvement in peacekeeping and peace 
operations. 
Efforts to promote democracy worldwide were strengthened 
in 1949 with the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program. As a result, military eguipment and training 
assistance were provided to Greece, Turkey, Iran, China, 
Korea, the Phillipines, and a number of Latin American 
nations. (Matloff, 1969) The U.S. continues to provide 
military assistance programs to this day. 
In this phase of the U.S. military, the armed forces also 
served as a major agent of social change. In 1948, President 
Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981, directing 
"equality of treatment and opportunity" in the armed forces. 
The full integration of blacks into the military was a direct 
result of Truman's order. It predated the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 by more than ten years in attempting to demonstrate 
racial equality in the United States. (Eitelberg, 1989) 
In the 1950s, the Army Corps of Engineers performed a 
major role in the planning, design, and construction of the 
St. Lawrence Seaway (Becker, 1984). The Navy provided sealift 
support to the French in 1954 in Vietnam.  A large number of 
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political refugees, cargo, and vehicles were transported from 
communist North Vietnam to the south following the French 
defeat. The Navy and Marines were also involved in the 
evacuation of 1,500 U.S. civilians from Egypt during the 1956 
Suez Canal incident. (Hagan, 1984) 
Army, Navy, and Marine forces responded to a Lebanese 
request for U.S. assistance in 1958. These forces helped to 
quell a rebellion and stabilize the situation before 
withdrawing. A similar action took place during a military 
revolt in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Army and Marine 
soldiers.were landed to protect U.S. nationals and prevent 
Communist expansion. During the 16 months the U.S. military 
forces were in the Dominican Republic, the troops maintained 
law and order, and distributed food and supplies. (Matloff, 
1969) 
As the U.S. Air Force grew and developed, it continued to 
provide humanitarian assistance worldwide. Examples during 
the 1960s included flights to provide support after flooding 
in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Tunisia, and Fairbanks, Alaska; food 
and supplies following an earthquake in Sicily; food to 
Ecuador during a severe drought; and evacuation of people from 
Costa Rica endangered by a volcanic eruption. The Air Force 
also worked with the Public Health Service to combat an 
encephalitis epidemic in Central America. (Callander, 1993) 
The late 1950s through the early 1970s were a period 
marked by civil unrest within America. The earlier discord 
revolved around racial problems, while later activity was 
largely related to protests against American involvement in 
the war in Vietnam. In 1957, President Eisenhower used Army 
and Arkansas National Guard troops to uphold a court order 
allowing nine black students to attend a high school in Little 
Rock. The troops broke up a mob and protected the students. 
Regular Army and federalized Guard personnel were also used to 
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control racially-motivated incidents in Mississippi in 1962 
and in Alabama in 1963 and 1965. (Matloff, 1969) 
Over 13,000 California National Guardsmen were used to 
help restore order during the Watts riots in 1965. Both 
regular Army soldiers and Michigan National Guardsmen were 
utilized to quell the Detroit riot of 1967. Rioting and mob 
action occurred across the nation following the assassination 
of Dr. Martin Luther King in 1968. In response, the National 
Guard was called out in a number of states. Federal troops as 
well were needed to help control the situations in Chicago, 
Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. (Matloff, 1969) 
During 1967-1971, Federal and National Guard soldiers 
were positioned to monitor anti-war demonstrations in the 
nation's capitol and elsewhere. Among the most widely known 
of these efforts was the infamous tragedy at Kent State 
University, where four demonstrators were killed and a dozen 
wounded. In 1970, over 18,000 Army National Guard and Reserve 
personnel were called into federal service to assist postal 
authorities for several weeks because of a mail strike that 
had originated in New York City. In 1971, over 10,000 
National Guardsmen, Marines, and Regular Army troops were used 
in Washington D.C. to guard highways and bridges and to keep 
traffic moving on May Day. Their efforts thwarted attempts by 
youthful demonstrators to prevent government employees from 
getting to work. (Matloff, 1969) 
The Vietnam War ended shortly after these last events. 
In the aftermath of the war and the end of the national draft, 
the U.S. armed forces became an All-Volunteer Force. The 
history of non-traditional missions performed by the American 
military and the Cold War phase of the American military 
continue in Chapter III (Huntington's "fifth phase" is 
examined in Chapter IV) . 
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III.  EXPERIENCES SINCE THE END OP THE DRAFT, 1973-1989 
In 1973, the end of the national draft ushered in the 
all-volunteer military in the United States. However, while 
the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) brought about 
enormous change in the services, it did not, in and of itself, 
cause a shift in the national interests or focus of the 
military. The country and the armed forces continued about 
their business of winning the Cold War; however, non- 
traditional missions remained a part of the U.S. military's 
daily regimen. For example, in just the 1980s, the Air Force 
performed more than 60 disaster relief, humanitarian, or 
rescue missions in 49 different countries (Department of the 
Air Force, 1990). 
This chapter details the history of non-traditional 
military missions in the transitory period between the birth 
of the AVF and the end of the Cold War in 1989. Although 
Chapter II is organized chronologically because of the sheer 
volume and diversity of the non-traditional missions involved, 
this chapter is organized by mission area to focus more 
directly on the important undertakings of the AVF. A summary 
chronology of non-traditional missions conducted by the 
military between 1973 and 1989 are listed in Table 3 below. 
A.   LAW ENFORCEMENT 
1.  The Drug War 
The military has played a role in America's "War on 
Drugs" since the 1960s (U.S. Congress, House 1990). 
Initially, this role had largely been providing shipping 
surveillance reports to other law enforcement agencies (U.S. 
Congress, Senate 1986).  However, in the 1980s, under the 
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Table  3.     Summary  Chronology  of  Non-Traditional  Missions 
in  U.S.   Military,   1973-1989 
Year Non-Traditional  Mission 
1973-81 National Guard  frequent public  sector  strike  replacements 
1973-on National Guard  support  for domestic  disaster relief 
1973-on UNTSO  -  U.N.-led Middle  East  peacekeeping  operation 
1973-on Foreign disaster relief  /  humanitarian aid 
1973 Flood  relief  to  Pakistan 
1974 Provided  support   after  Jonestown  cult  mass   suicide 
1974 Noncombatant  Evacuation Operation   in  Cyprus 
1975-88 Army  civil-military  community   support  program 
1975 Flood  relief  to  Romania 
1975 Earthquake  relief  to  Guatemala  City 
1976 Noncombatant  Evacuation  Operation   in  Lebanon 
1976 Earthquake relief to Turkey 
1977 Extensive  snow removal  assistance  in New York 
1978-79 Noncombatant  Evacuation Operation   in   Iran 
1980 Supported other agencies   in Mariel  Boatlift  response 
1980 Earthquake relief to Algeria 
1980-on MFO - U.S.-led peacekeeping operation  in the Sinai Desert 
1980 Assisted  in roof-top evacuation at  Las Vegas MGM hotel  fire 
1981 Replace  striking air traffic  controllers 
1982-on Increased participation  in War on Drugs 
1982-84 MNF  -  U.S.-led  peacekeeping  operation   in  Lebanon 
1983-on Humanitarian  &  Civic  Assistance  program  in  Central  America 
1984 National Guard  support  for Los Angeles  Summer Olympic Games 
1985-on Navy Personnel Excellence Partnership civil-military program 
1985-on Humanitarian Assistance  Program:   excess  property  and  aid 
1985-on Denton Program:   space available transport of  relief  supplies 
1988 Earthquake  relief  to Armenia 
1988 Army & USMC units  help  fight  Yellowstone National  Park fires 
direction of President Reagan,  the participation of the armed 
forces was greatly expanded. 
The Defense Authorization Act of 1982 was aimed at 
clarifying the types of assistance that the military could 
provide in the Drug War and added sections to Title 10 of the 
United States Code (USC) . Sections 371, 372, and 372 were 
added to allow the military to work with federal, state, and 
local law enforcement agencies through sharing information, 
use of equipment and facilities, and training of law 
enforcement    personnel. Although    these    proceedings    were 
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previously legal, the legislation was passed to avoid possible 
conflict with interpretations of the Posse Comitatus Act, 
which prevents the use of federal troops in enforcing civilian 
laws. (U.S. Congress, House 1990) 
Additionally, section 374 provided an exception to the 
Posse Comitatus Act that allowed the military to assist, 
operate and maintain loaned equipment under certain restricted 
conditions (i.e., the conduct of operations directed at 
criminal violations of federal drug and immigration laws, 
particularly those related to air and sea traffic). Section 
375 served to reaffirm the Posse Comitatus Act by ensuring 
that the military assistance did not involve direct 
participation in any search, seizure, arrest, or interdiction. 
(U.S. Congress, House 1990) 
As a result of these measures, DOD played a more active 
role in the Drug War. The greatest amount of military support 
involved aerial surveillance. For example, in fiscal 1985 
alone, military aircraft such as Air Force AWACS, Marine Corps 
OV-lOs, and Navy P-3s, S-3s, and E-2s flew more than 3,000 
sorties and 10,000 flight hours to assist law enforcement 
agencies. Also in 1985, the armed forces answered almost 
8,000 assistance requests for facility use, equipment loans, 
explosives disposal, security and training assistance, and 
other mission support. The Navy provided ship deployment days 
for embarked U.S. Coast Guard tactical law enforcement teams 
to engage in boardings of suspected drug traffickers. The Air 
Force operated two aerostat radar sites in Florida to track 
airborne drug traffickers. The National Guard aided the 
civilian authorities of 14 states in 1984 and 20 states in 
1985. The 1985 National Guard efforts resulted in the 
eradication of nearly 200,000 marijuana plants worth more than 
$260 million. Between passage of the new legislation in 1982 
and mid-1986, the military had loaned more than $111 million 
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in equipment to agencies for enforcement of drug laws. (U.S. 
Congress, Senate 1986) 
In fiscal 1987, the armed forces reported expenditures of 
$389 million for drug law enforcement assistance (GAO 1988, 
NSIAD-88-45). In fiscal 1988, DOD assets flew an estimated 
28,000 aerial surveillance flight hours and contributed over 
2,000 ship days to support of the Coast Guard (GAO 1991, 
NSIAD-91-117). 
Despite the apparent amount and growth of military 
involvement, officials in Congress were not completely 
pleased. During a Senate hearing in July 1986, Senator 
Alfonse D'Amato, a member of the Committee on Appropriations, 
stated: 
Mr. Chairman, they are hiding behind the posse 
comitatus. It comes down to Secretary Weinberger 
and some of the admirals and generals and the Navy 
and the Air Force who do not like the mission of 
fighting drugs. They do not want it . . . 
If we are going to do something 
effectively the military must be involved in 
utilizing its resources and coordinating them. 
Instead, they have done everything they can to duck 
out, and their big claim is look at this, look at 
the assets we made available. Of course, they did 
not make them available. The Congress ordered they 
be made available. They were brought kicking and 
screaming to do what little they've done. 
What we have is society saying we have a total 
commitment to battle drugs and we have the military 
saying, well, we do not want to do that for a whole 
variety of reasons, including posse comitatus as 
one of the reasons. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1986, 
p.43) 
As some questioned the commitment of DOD, others were 
concerned about the extent of growing military involvement. 
During 1988 Congressional hearings, the Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services questioned how the "new role 
[would] affect military readiness and current military 
operations" (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220, p. 13), and the ranking 
minority committee member wanted to ensure that military 
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assistance would not "denigrate the Department's [DOD] primary 
role, namely, of providing for our national defense." (GAO 
1993, NSIAD-93-220, p. 13) Also, the Secretary of Defense was 
concerned about "inefficiency and degraded readiness that 
could result from an expanded military role." (GAO 1993, 
NSIAD-93-220, p. 13) 
Passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and established 
a cabinet-level position for the ONDCP's director (U.S. 
Congress, House 1990). While this move was ample evidence of 
the seriousness with which the nation regarded the War on 
Drugs, a consensus on military participation had not been 
reached when the Cold War ended. The role of American armed 
forces in the Drug War underwent a substantial change in 1989. 
These changes, the after-effects, and current developments are 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
2.  The Cuban Boatlift 
Between April and September 1980, approximately 125,000 
Cubans left their country for the U.S. by small boat in what 
has become known as the Cuban or Mariel Boatlift. Most of 
these people were refugees fleeing a repressive Communist 
government; however, others were criminals. Castro apparently 
used the opportunity to rid himself and the country of felons. 
(Parker, 1993) 
Many vessels used in the boatlift were small and 
overloaded with refugees. What would normally have been seen 
as a law enforcement operation involving illegal immigration 
quickly became a humanitarian mission to prevent loss of life. 
The U.S. Coast Guard attempted to provide the necessary 
humanitarian support, but did not have enough assets to 
perform the job adequately. As a result, the Navy became 
involved and five Navy ships patrolled the Northern area of 
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the  waters  between  Cuba  and  Florida  to  help  prevent 
unnecessary deaths. (Parker, 1993) 
Additionally, after arrival of some Cuban Boatlift 
refugees in the U.S., Air Force units were used to transport 
them to various processing centers around the country 
(Military Airlift Command Office of History, 1991). The Navy 
participation was a precursor for involvement in Haitian and 
Cuban immigration operations in the 1990s. 
B.   DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 
1.  Civil Disturbances 
a. Public Sector Labor Disputes 
President Nixon's use of federal troops in the 1970 
postal strike set a modern precedent for military involvement 
in public sector labor strikes. Although the armed forces 
have a long history of participation in breaking strikes and 
even in replacing striking employees when the workers were 
engaged in defense-related activities, the military had only 
been used once before (in the 1919 Boston police strike) to 
replace public-sector workers. (Jacobs, 1982) 
In 1971, National Guardsmen were used once for state 
purposes to replace firefighters, but between 1973 and 1981 
military units were called up 45 times. Over the course of 
the nation's history, several legislative restraints have been 
placed on the use of the military in domestic circumstances. 
A primary example is the previously-mentioned Posse Comitatus 
Act. (Jacobs, 1982) 
Perhaps the combination of Nixon's broadening of 
executive power with increased availability of soldiers 
following the end of the Vietnam War led to the upsurge of 
this "new" role.  Although an examination of the legality or 
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reasons behind this usage of military personnel is outside the 
scope of this paper, the 1973-1989 time period did result in 
significant increases in the involvement of the military as 
replacements for striking public employees. 
Federal troops were used only once in the 45 
replacement episodes during the air traffic controller strike 
in 1981. All of the other incidents involved state use of 
National Guard personnel. Many states allow governors to call 
out the Guard for a broadly defined "emergency," which 
probably accounts for the large federal-state difference. 
(Jacobs, 1982) 
The Guardsmen were used to replace city and state 
employees, mental health and hospital workers, prison guards, 
police, and firefighters, among others. While some of the 
replacement work (such as the medical situations and prisons) 
required some specific on-the-job training, the troops were 
already relatively well-trained for the police work. 
Performance by the National Guard in these replacement actions 
was reported as mostly satisfactory, even in the more 
dangerous situations like firefighting. The same is true for 
public reaction to the Guard's involvement. (Jacobs, 1982) 
The use of the National Guard to replace striking 
public sector employees dwindled in the latter stages of this 
period. This may have been the result of tighter state 
budgets that reduced the likelihood that the Guard would be 
called up (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1982), increased public 
awareness of this use of the Guard, or changes in labor 
practices. Whatever the reason for the decline, striker 
replacement was an important National Guard non-traditional 
mission, and the potential for its use remains. 
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b.     Other Civil Disturbances 
The National Guard and other military units were 
also used throughout the 1973-1989 period to support state and 
local governments in dealing with, what the National Guard 
terms, "other civil disturbances." These disturbances 
included civil unrest, demonstrations, strikes, blockades, 
prison disorders, and a variety of assistance to law 
enforcement. Use of the National Guard for these purposes is 
detailed in Appendix A. 
In fiscal 1974, for example, the National Guard was 
used extensively to control disturbances related to trucker 
strikes and blockades across the nation (U.S. National Guard 
Bureau, 1974). In fiscal 1981, plans and units were prepared 
for a threatened national postal strike (U.S. National Guard 
Bureau, 1981). Fiscal 1982 support included operations 
monitoring anti-nuclear demonstrations against nuclear power 
plants and laboratories (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1982). 
To provide support to civil authorities at the 1984 
Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles, almost a thousand 
Guardsmen were activated for aviation and logistics missions 
(U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1982). 
2.  Civil-Military Programs 
In the 1973-1989 period, both the Army and the Navy 
launched minor initiatives authorizing the use of military 
personnel and resources for support of local civilian 
communities. The Army Domestic Action program was initiated 
in 1975 by Secretary "Bo" Callaway and put forth under Army 
Regulation 28-19 (Nunn, 1993). The Navy began its Personal 
Excellence Partnership program in 1985 (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995). 
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The Army program was a decentralized effort and allowed 
local military commanders to assist their communities through 
actions such as repair of recreation facilities and 
supervision of summer programs for disadvantaged youths. Top 
Army leadership failed to push and support the program 
strongly enough and the regulation governing the program was 
terminated in 1988 after interest had faded (Nunn, 1993). 
However, some individual base activities were continued and 
remain to this day (Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Reserve Affairs, 1995). 
The Navy program was aimed at helping to "educate 
America's youth in the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship." (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve 
Affairs, 1995, p. 2) Navy volunteers provide assistance 
through coaching, mentoring, and support of health and science 
fairs and environmental and other community efforts (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995). The 
program is still actively supported by the Navy and, as of 
1993, six of the Navy projects had been recognized in the 
Presidential "Daily Points of Light" program (Nunn, 1993). 
3.  Disaster Relief 
a. Background 
Chapter II mentions several examples of military 
assistance in the wake of domestic disasters. In providing 
domestic disaster relief, the armed forces seek to assist 
local communities until state and local agencies can sustain 
their own relief efforts (Stoll, 1994). The role and nature 
of military assistance has evolved over time. 
In 1947, Congress passed legislation allowing the 
President to make surplus wartime supplies available to states 
and local governments during disasters. The Federal Disaster 
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Act of 1950 (Public Law 875) further authorized the President 
to use all departments of the Government to give assistance 
after the occurrence of a major natural disaster. Additional 
legislation was enacted in 1966 following the Alaskan 
earthquake of 19 64 and flooding in the Midwestern U.S. 
(Harrison, 1992) 
After approval of the Comprehensive Disaster Relief 
Act of 1970, DOD generated a directive (3025.1) outlining 
policy for the "Use of Military Resources During Natural 
Disaster Emergencies within the United States, its 
Territories, and Possessions." Policy guidelines stipulated 
that military participation should not interfere with the 
primary defense mission nor involve personnel in law 
enforcement action that could violate the Posse Comitatus Act. 
Additionally, military personnel were required to remain under 
military command, and military resources could not be acquired 
or kept specifically for domestic disaster relief. (Harrison, 
1992) 
In 1973, the Secretary of the Army was designated as 
the Executive Agent for coordinating military support to civil 
emergencies. These duties are fulfilled by the Director of 
Military Support (DOMS) in Washington, D.C. (Harrison, 1992) 
The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-288) 
was passed to better structure agency responsibilities during 
disasters and national emergencies. It directed federal and 
state organizations to plan and coordinate disaster response 
actions. However, the fact that different federal agencies 
were responsible for different types of disaster relief was a 
continuing cause of confusion. This led to the creation in 
1978 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA). 
(Stoll, 1994) 
FEMA became responsible for the coordination of 
inter-departmental and inter-agency disaster relief response, 
yet it was still hampered by a lack of authority over 
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organizations that regarded the emergency relief mission as 
secondary to their real purposes (Stoll, 1994). However, FEMA 
efforts eventually led in 1987 to a "Plan for Federal Response 
to a Catastrophic Earthquake" that had been approved by the 28 
federal agencies involved (Harrison, 1992). Federal Response 
was divided into 12 separate functions, and agencies were 
designated with lead or support roles. DOD was named the lead 
agency for two functions (urban search and rescue, public 
works and engineering) and a support agency for the remaining 
ten (Stoll, 1994). 
In 1988, Public Law 93-288 was amended by the Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
(Stafford Act). The Stafford Act authorized the federal 
government to respond to disasters to save lives and property 
and protect public health and safety. It gave the President 
the power to direct any federal agency to provide support to 
state and local agencies in times of emergency and disaster. 
If a major disaster is declared, the state is required to 
share up to 25 percent of the cost of federal assistance. 
FEMA is the designated lead agency with the direction to carry 
out the Stafford Act. (Stoll, 1994) 
b.     Military Disaster Response 
The military continued its pattern and record, of 
domestic emergency assistance during this period. While 
support varied from year to year because of need, states 
activated the National Guard annually to provide relief in the 
aftermath of floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, wind and ice 
storms, forest fires, chemical spills, power outages, and 
other natural and manmade disasters. See Appendix A for an 
illustration of the magnitude of the National Guard response. 
In addition to major disasters, the National Guard 
was also used to provide assistance for smaller or more 
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unusual contingencies. In fiscal 1981, the Guard assisted the 
state of California in efforts to eradicate the Med-fly menace 
to the state's fruit crop industry (U.S. National Guard 
Bureau, 1981). Regular DOD forces were involved in a highly 
unusual and tragic "domestic" emergency in 1974. After the 
mass suicide of Reverend Jim Jones and the over 900 members of 
his Jonestown colony, the Air Force transported Air Force, 
Army, and FBI personnel to and from the scene in Guyana. A 
total of 915 bodies were recovered, identified, and flown back 
to the U.S. (Lempert and others, 1992) 
Of course, the active-duty military also provided 
support after emergencies and large natural catastrophes. In 
1977, Air Force aircraft flew rescue teams and equipment to 
Kentucky following a coal mine disaster. After an enormous 
snowfall in Buffalo, New York in February 1977, the Air Force 
flew 48 missions to carry almost 1,000 tons of equipment and 
500 people to the area to assist in snow removal efforts. The 
Air Force also supported the Nuclear Regulatory Agency by 
transporting men and material to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 
the wake of the Three-Mile Island nuclear power plant 
malfunctions in 1979. (Military Airlift Command Office of 
History, 1991) 
Air Force helicopters assisted civil efforts to 
evacuate people from the Las Vegas MGM Grand Hotel in 1980. 
Over 100 individuals were either hoisted from balconies or 
taken from the roof during this mission (Lempert and others, 
1992) In fiscal 1983, military personnel responded to 
Hawaii's first major hurricane in 23 years and California's 
most devastating earthquake since 1906 (U.S. National Guard 
Bureau, 1983). 
In 1988, the Air Force provided the equivalent of 68 
C-141 transport aircraft cargo loads of personnel and 
equipment to support actions to put out forest fires in the 
continental  U.S.  (Department  of  the Air  Force,  1990). 
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Additionally, two Army and two Marine Corps battalions 
assisted efforts to combat fires that year in Yellowstone 
National Park, and two other Army battalions aided fire- 
fighting efforts in the Lewis and Clark National Forest 
(Kelly, 1992) . 
C.   PEACE OPERATIONS 
1.  Peacekeeping 
The United States had two new experiences with 
peacekeeping in this period. These were the Multinational 
Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula and the 
Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon. 
After the cease-fire that ended the Arab-Israeli War in 
1973, five years elapsed before any substantial movement 
toward a treaty occurred. President Jimmy Carter worked with 
Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat and Israeli leader Menachem Begin 
in 1978 to derive the Camp David Accords. A formal peace 
treaty followed in 1979. In addition to an Israeli withdrawal 
from the Sinai peninsula, the treaty called for United Nations 
observers to monitor the area. When the U.N. declined to 
provide a peacekeeping force, the U.S., with the approval of 
Egypt and Israel, created the MFO. The eleven nations 
participating in the MFO were Australia, New Zealand, 
Colombia, Fiji, France, Italy, Holland, England, Uruguay, 
Norway, and the U.S. (Williams, 1985) 
U.S. military personnel comprised the largest segment of 
the MFO with over 1,000 Americans among the 2,600 members of 
the force. An infantry battalion of up to 800 soldiers from 
either the 82nd or 101st Airborne Divisions was included in 
the U.S. detail along with medical and logistics personnel 
(Williams, 1985). The mission of the American peacekeeping 
detachment and the MFO was to "observe, report and verify, and 
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have a military presence" in conjunction with the terms of the 
peace treaty (Williams, 1985, p. 11) . 
The MFO is an example of the use of peacekeeping "to 
supplement and reinforce a peace treaty" (Evans, 1987). This 
peacekeeping operation continues. Perhaps, because the treaty 
has been supported by both the Egyptians and the Israelis, the 
MFO has enjoyed a lifetime free from major incidents. 
The Multi-National Force existed in Lebanon between 1982 
and 1984, and was composed of members from France, Italy, 
England, and the U.S. (Evans, 1987). The MNF was created and 
sent into Beirut after massacres at the Sabra and Shatila 
refugee camps in September 1982 (Evans, 1993). While 
initially intended as a "humanitarian" peacekeeping operation 
to prevent further violence against Palestinians (Evans, 1993) 
and to separate the opposing sides in a civil war (Evans, 
1987) , the mission evolved to assisting the Lebanese 
government attempt to regain control of the country (Evans, 
1993) . 
The American contingent of the MNF consisted of roughly 
1,800 Marines and sailors from a Marine Amphibious Unit 
(Gaddo, 1984). Although the MNF had enjoyed support from all 
sides in Beirut, the changed purpose of the peacekeeping 
mission was seen by the non-government factions as taking 
sides in the struggle (Evans, 1993). Conditions in Lebanon 
became more violent as U.S. forces and positions came under 
attack and eventually responded in kind. The situation 
culminated in the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine 
headquarters in Beirut and the deaths of 245 sailors and 
marines (Gaddo, 1984). The situation in Lebanon continued to 
deteriorate and American Embassy personnel and citizens were 
evacuated in February 1984 as the U.S. withdrew its 
peacekeeping force (Younghouse and Haligan, 1984). The loss 
of neutrality is seen by some analysts as the primary reason 
for the failure of the MNF, since the Americans and other 
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members were no longer seen as impartial observers (Graham, 
1993) . 
2.  Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 
During periods of strife overseas, U.S. military forces 
are often used to evacuate U.S. citizens, both government and 
regular civilian, from possible harm and exposure to combat. 
In the military vernacular, these types of missions are called 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). 
In 1974, U.S. civilians were evacuated from Cyprus by 
American naval forces during a period of conflict between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot elements. In 1976, U.S. Navy 
helicopters flew nearly 250 Americans and Europeans out of 
Lebanon while Lebanese factions were engaged in hostilities 
(Collier, 1989) . Prior to the revolt against the Shah in 
Iran, the Air Force brought nearly 9 00 Americans out of 
Tehran during December 1978 (Military Airlift Command Office 
of History, 1991) . In the aftermath of the revolt, Navy 
personnel evacuated 440 people from the Iranian ports of 
Bandar Abbas and Char Bahar in February 1979 (Hagan, 1984). 
D.   HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FOREIGN) 
1.  Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program 
The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program is 
authorized under section 401 of Title 10, USC. This program 
allows DOD to engage in "State Department-approved 
humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction 
with authorized military operations." (Irvin, 1994, p. 2) The 
assistance is restricted to actions that use the operational 
skills of the forces involved, are not military-related, do 
not duplicate other assistance efforts,  and are in the 
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interests of both the U.S. and the host country (Hogberg and 
Stone, 1993). 
From 1973 to 1989, the armed forces often performed 
training abroad and provided aid and assistance to foreign 
nations in the process. For example, between 1983 and 1987, 
more than 24,000 Army and Air National Guard members 
participated in training in Panama and Honduras. In addition 
to more traditional jungle-warfare, artillery, armor, airlift, 
and air defense training, their activities included road- 
building and medical, civil engineering, and civil affairs 
training exercises. (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195) 
Between 1983 and 1987, Army Guardsmen and other U.S. 
forces participated in medical and construction projects such 
as building and improving airstrips and other facilities 
during joint-Honduran exercises known as AHUAS TARA I, II, and 
III. Approximately 3,500 National Guard personnel helped 
repair and construct 20 kilometers of road in Honduras as part 
of BLAZING TRAILS 1986. In BLAZING TRAILS 1987, Guardsmen 
conducting logistics and public affairs training supported 
Army Reserve personnel building a 5.5 kilometer road in 
Honduras. (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195) 
In Panama, 778 Guardsmen built a 15 kilometer road as 
part of exercise MINUTEMAN I during 1984. The next year 5,418 
Guardsmen were involved in BLAZING TRAILS 1985 where the 15 
kilometer road was repaired and a new 27 kilometer road 
constructed. Army Guardsmen supported Army Reserve personnel 
in the building of a 20 kilometer road as part of BLAZING 
TRAILS 1986. Also, more than 6,000 National Guard members 
were involved in medical readiness, public affairs, and other 
training during these years. (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195) 
Additionally, 814 Air National Guard personnel from 
"prime beef" units conducted construction, electronics, and 
plumbing training exercises in either Panama or Honduras over 
this  same period.   Over  5,000 Air National Guardsmen 
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participated in VOLANT OAK training that included disaster 
relief, search and rescue, and transport of medical assistance 
teams among their defense missions. (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195) 
These missions "provided economic development assistance 
to Honduras and Panama." (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195, p. 11) 
According to Joseph E. Kelley (Associate Director of GAO's 
National Security and International Affairs Division), "The 
National Guard has benefited Honduras and Panama through its 
exercises, principally by constructing roads. ... In 
addition, Guard units have provided medical treatment, 
improved school buildings, and participated in other 
humanitarian assistance activities." (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195, 
p. 2) Moreover, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau stated 
the opportunities to expand training into 
Central America have greatly benefited the Guard's 
capabilities to plan for, mobilize, and conduct 
operations in a tropical or subtropical 
environment. . . . Such overseas locations provide 
additional opportunities to conduct essential 
training for engineering and logistics, 
communications, infantry, field artillery, armor, 
aviation, and special forces personnel." (GAO 1988, 
NSIAD-88-195, p. 10) 
These involvements of U.S. armed forces exemplify the 
military performing non-traditional missions that provide a 
"non-combat" benefit while supporting readiness and training. 
2.  Humanitarian Assistance Program 
The Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), also known as 
the Excess Property Program, was established in 1985 (Hogberg 
and Stone, 1993) under sections 2547 and 2551 of Title 10 U.S. 
Code. Section 2547 authorizes the donation of excess, 
nonlethal DOD supplies to foreign countries through the 
Department of State.   Section 2551 allows funding for 
35 
transportation of foreign humanitarian relief and other 
purposes. (Irvin, 1994) 
The HAP was instituted to enable the U.S. to provide 
equipment to Afghan rebels and resistance groups. The first 
shipment of supplies was flown into Afghanistan in March 1986. 
Equipment was sent to Cambodia in 1987, and numerous other 
countries have since been provided assistance. Typically, 
U.S. embassies receive requests for materiel, and then the 
Department of State processes the requests before delivering 
them to DOD. Next, the military transports the supplies and 
equipment worldwide for transfer to a State Department 
official and the requesting country (Hogberg and Stone, 1993). 
Military units and personnel gain experience by operating in 
new and different locales. 
Examples of excess property provided by the U.S. armed 
services include vehicles, furniture, clothing, tools, and 
medical and construction equipment and supplies. The property 
is provided in "as is" condition without guarantees or 
additional support (Irvin, 1994). An estimated $49 million of 
DOD equipment was donated through the HAP between 1986 and 
1989 (U.S. Congress, House 1990). The HAP enables the 
military to promote democracy promotion goals while providing 
its own members operational training in overseas areas. 
3.  The Denton Program 
The Denton Program is named for former Senator Jeremiah 
Denton and was established in 1985 under section 402 of Title 
10, USC. The program permits DOD to transport privately 
donated humanitarian supplies to foreign countries on a no- 
cost, space-available basis. (Irvin, 1994) 
Management of the Denton Program usually included the 
Department of State and the Agency for International 
Development (AID) along with DOD (Hogberg and Stone, 1993). 
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In the first six years of the program, the U.S. Air Force had 
two officers assigned to help manage the program and an 
average of "a couple million pounds per year" of goods were 
transported (Rourke, 1995). 
4.  Foreign Disaster Relief and Assistance 
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 brought about the 
Foreign Disaster Assistance Program. Under this program, 
AID'S Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) may request 
DOD assets for foreign disaster relief. The disasters may be 
the results of both natural events, such as hurricanes, 
flooding and earthquakes, or manmade occurrences, such as 
accidents or warfare. (Hogberg and Stone, 1993) 
U.S. military forces participated in disaster relief 
efforts in Pakistan in 1973 following flooding which killed 
more than 400 people and affected four million. DOD also 
assisted Romania in 1975 after a flood impacted over one 
million people (Irvin, 1994) . Supplies were flown to 
Guatemala City in 1975 and Turkey in 1976 subsequent to 
earthquakes in those respective countries (Military Airlift 
Command Office of History, 1991). 
In October 1980, Algeria was struck by two devastating 
earthquakes. The Uis. Air Force responded within 3 6 hours and 
delivered a total of 340 tons of relief supplies. This U.S. 
military force action "strengthened international bonds" that 
later led to Algeria taking the lead role in mediation efforts 
that brought about the release of American hostages from Iran. 
(Department of the Air Force, 1990, p. 14) 
Between 1984 and 1989, DOD responded to 42 requests for 
disaster relief assistance from OFDA. DOD action helped 28 
countries worldwide including Chile, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Jamaica, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Armenia, Pakistan, 
Korea, and the Phillipines. The disasters ranged from floods, 
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earthquakes, hurricanes, and volcanic eruptions to famine, 
plane crashes, explosions, and civil strife (Hogberg and 
Stone, 1993). An overview of Air Force support to these and 
other non-traditional missions during this period can be found 
in Appendix B. 
Support for these missions totaled more than $6 million 
and included personnel along with food, medical supplies, 
communications and other equipment, blankets, cots and tents. 
Medical, engineering, and search-and-rescue teams were among 
the manpower assistance (Hogberg and Stone, 1993). Statistics 
for the Air Force airlift after the 1988 earthquake in Armenia 
help provide a perspective of the extent of support and great 
distances often involved in U.S. aid supported by the 
military. In this one operation, 513 tons of relief supplies 
and more than 2 00 people were transported to an area almost 
10,000 kilometers from the continental U.S.  (Lempert and 
others, 1992) 
In summary, the period from 1973 until 1989 was a time of 
active U.S. military involvement in non-traditional missions. 
Although the armed forces did participate to a greater degree 
in law enforcement activities than the military had done in 
the recent past, the first 16 years of the All-Volunteer Force 
were, with respect to non-traditional missions, principally 
business as usual. 
However, the non-traditional mission tempo did accelerate 
somewhat in the last few years before 1989 with the 
combination of greater attention to domestic concerns and 
programs promoting democracy abroad. Perhaps these actions 
were in response to signs of a changing world and the 
impending collapse of the Communist bloc. The ramifications 
of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the ensuing end of 
the Cold War on America, the U.S. military, and non- 
traditional missions are discussed in the next chapter. 
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IV.  INITIATIVES AND DIRECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND CURRENT ALTERNATIVE 
MISSION PROPOSALS 
In Chapter II, reference is made to Samuel Huntington's 
discussion of changes in the U.S. military's missions. 
Huntington alluded to the end of the Cold War as a precursor 
for a "fifth phase of American defense policy." (Huntington, 
1993, p. 38) For the purposes of this paper, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 will serve as a point to mark both the end 
of the Cold War and the beginning of the new phase. 
Since 1989, the future direction of the U.S. military has 
been a topic of considerable debate. However, a clear label 
for the military focus of this phase has yet to emerge. This 
chapter examines the broad and growing range of non- 
traditional missions that have suddenly become more important 
as the new phase continues to evolve. A summary chronology of 
non-traditional missions conducted by the military between 
1989 and the present can be found in Table 4 below. 
A.   SETTING THE STAGE 
In a February 1993 presentation, Senator Sam Nunn, then 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, clearly 
and succinctly stated the situation facing America's military 
after the end of the Cold War: 
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
Union give us a chance to make significant 
reductions in the size of our military forces and 
our defense budget. . . . But tremors of 
instability and outright regional conflict are 
continuing to shake many parts of the globe. These 
volatile situations, coupled with the changing 
nature of the world's balance of power, mean that 
we must still maintain a strong, and perhaps, even 
more flexible military force. 
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Over the next few years, the nation will 
continue the debate over what size the base force 
should be, what roles and missions it should 
undertake, and how it should be structured. There 
is considerable uncertainty at this time on just 
what kind of a military capability we will need in 
the future and what size force will be adequate. 
We are leaving a security era that demanded 
large numbers of U.S. combat forces stationed 
overseas or operating in forward locations at high 
states of combat readiness in order to confront a 
large and quantitatively superior opponent. That 
era has ended. We are entering a security era that 
permits a shift in our overall strategy more toward 
smaller force levels, with fewer overseas 
deployments and lower operating tempos. ... It 
will be a smaller force than we have today. We all 
know that. ... It will have to be just as 
professional—and even more flexible. The force 
will still need a basic amount of combat^ and 
operations training to sustain maximum proficiency 
. . . as well as readiness. But there will be a 
much greater opportunity than in the past to use 
military assets and training to assist civilian 
efforts .... (Nunn, 1993, pp. 1-2) 
The final sentence of Senator Nunn's quotation refers to 
using the military in domestic "efforts" (Nunn, 1993) , but his 
ideas have a much broader application. 
While some surely saw the end of the Cold War as an 
opportunity to slash an oversized and unnecessary defense 
community and profit from the "peace dividend," others looked 
for ways to maintain the military infrastructure. Planners 
sought ideas to preserve military budgets by assisting 
civilians. Many proposals for use of the military in the so- 
called "non-traditional" missions such as disaster response, 
interdiction of drugs and refugees, peacekeeping, and 
humanitarian response and aid began to emerge and continue to 
this day. The term "double-duty dollars" was used to justify 
programs that would maintain military might while serving the 
populace in the process (Eitelberg, 1993, pp. 19-20). The 
remainder of this chapter focuses on these varied programs and 
proposals. 
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Table 4.  Summary Chronology of Non-Traditional Missions 
in U.S. Military, 1989-Present 
Year        Non-Traditional Mission 
1989-on National Guard support for domestic disaster relief 
1989-on UNTSO - U.N.-led Middle East peacekeeping operation 
1989-on MNF - U.S.-led peacekeeping operation in the Sinai desert 
1989-on Humanitarian & Civic Assistance program in Central America 
1989-on Humanitarian Assistance Program: excess property and aid 
1989-on Denton Program: space available transport of relief supplies 
1989-on Lead agency for detection/monitoring for the Drug War 
1989 Clean-up support for Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska 
1989 Hurricane Hugo - domestic disaster relief in South Carolina 
1989 Loma Prieta earthquake - disaster relief in San Francisco 
1991 Operation Sea Angel - flood relief in Bangladesh 
1991 Fiery Vigil - evacuation after Philippine volcanic eruption 
1991-on UNIKOM - U.N.-led peacekeeping operation in Kuwait 
1991-93 Able Manner - Haitian migrant interdiction 
1991-on MINURSO - U.N.-led peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara 
1991-on Operation Provide Comfort - Kurdish relief effort in Iraq 
1992 Civil disturbance control for Los Angeles riots 
1992-on Provide Hope - humanitarian relief in former Soviet Union 
1992-94 Provide Relief/Restore Hope - aid/peace ops in Somalia 
1992-94 Operation Provide Promise - humanitarian aid to Bosnia 
1992 Operation Provide Transition - election support in Angola 
1992 Hurricane Andrew - domestic disaster relief in Florida 
1992 Typhoon Omar - domestic disaster relief in Guam 
1992 Hurricane Iniki - domestic disaster relief in Hawaii 
1992 Noncombatant evacuation from Monrovia, Liberia 
1992 Noncombatant evacuation from Tajikistan 
1992 Flood relief in Pakistan 
1993 Support for Chinese migrant interdiction in Kwajalein 
1993 Election transition support for Cambodia 
1993 Flooding in U.S. Midwest - domestic disaster relief 
1993-on UNPROFOR - U.N.-led peacekeeping operation in Macedonia 
1993-on Commencement of SecDef Civil-Military programs 
1993 Earthquake relief for Bombay, India 
1994 Northridge earthquake - domestic disaster relief in L.A. 
1994 Operation Support Hope - humanitarian assistance in Rwanda 
1994 Support for interdiction of Cuban balseros 
1994 Flooding in U.S. Southeast - domestic disaster relief 
1994-on Humanitarian demining program 
1994-on UNOMIG - U.N.-led peace operation in Georgia 
1994-on Operations Uphold/Maintain Democracy in Haiti 
1994-95 UNMIH - U.N.-led peace operation in Haiti 
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B.   LAW ENFORCEMENT 
1.  The Drug War Expands 
When Congress passed the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 1989, the military was tasked with greater involvement 
in drug enforcement efforts. DOD was given the responsibility 
for: 
• serving as the single lead federal agency for 
detecting and monitoring air and seaborne drug 
smugglers; 
• integrating command, control, communications, and 
technical intelligence functions of agencies involved 
in drug interdiction into an effective network; and 
• approving and funding state plans for use of the 
National Guard in drug enforcement activities. 
These measures were aimed at improving agency coordination and 
interdiction levels. However, the military was still 
restricted from involvement in actual apprehension and seizure 
operations. (GAO 1991, NSIAD-91-117) 
To accomplish the detection and monitoring mission, DOD 
established an organizational structure typical of that used 
for traditional missions. An Assistant Secretary of Defense 
position as DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and 
Support was created to handle policy issues. The operational 
issues were delegated to the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of 
the respective geographic areas. In turn, the CINCs 
implemented joint task forces (JTF-4 in Key West for CINCLANT, 
JTF-5 in Alameda for CINCPAC, and JTF-5 in El Paso for 
CINCFOR) to bring about the coordination of agencies and 
resources. The joint task forces also act to coordinate and 
disseminate intelligence information to and from law 
enforcement agencies. (GAO 1991, NSIAD-91-117) 
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To integrate communications, the military purchased $143 
million in telecommunications equipment. This equipment was 
then loaned to law enforcement agencies to foster 
interoperable and secure communications. DOD also worked to 
develop a data network known as the Anti-Drug Network that 
would provide automatic transfer of information and 
intelligence among the military and civilian agencies involved 
in the Drug War. (GAO 1991, NSIAD-91-117) 
Some in Congress were concerned that the armed forces 
were not moving quickly enough. In July 1989, "the House 
Committee on Armed Services admonished DOD for being slow to 
implement the responsibilities assigned to it in the 1988 
Authorization Act, and for failing to include funds for drug 
interdiction in its budget request." (U.S. Congress, House 
1990, p. 10) However, a 1990 staff report to the House 
Committee on Government Operations concluded: 
This reluctance has now apparently given way 
to a new willingness to implement its anti- 
narcotics responsibilities, which was spurred in 
part by the Secretary's [of Defense] emphasis on 
the importance of DOD's participation in anti-drug 
activities and, according to some media accounts, 
by the perception that the threat to U.S. security 
from the communist bloc countries has substantially 
lessened and that the current national security 
threat is from drugs. (U.S. Congress, House 1990, 
pp. 10-11) 
Whatever the reason, a sign of the military's new role in 
the Drug War was a funding increase for detection and 
monitoring from $211.5 million in fiscal 1989 to over $800 
million in fiscal 1993. All DOD drug enforcement-related 
funding in fiscal 1993 amounted to $1.14 billion; however, 
this sum was less than one percent of the total defense budget 
for that year. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220) 
The added funding brought a corresponding surge in the 
activity of the armed services. It was reflected by increases 
in flying hours and steaming days between fiscal 1989 and 
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fiscal 1993 (estimated) from 18,436 to over 94,000 and from 
2,081 to nearly 5,000, respectively (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220) . 
Drug seizures in the Caribbean increased from 8.2 metric tons 
in 1989 to 70.5 metric tons in 1991 (Dorsey, 1992). Beginning 
in September 1989, U.S. military personnel were sent to 
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to help train forces of those 
countries in operations against narcotics producers and 
traffickers (Collier, 1989). In 1992, 14,500 pounds of 
cocaine were seized by joint Army/Drug Enforcement Agency and 
Bahamian police involvement in OPBAT (Operations Bahamas Turks 
and Caicos). The National Guard has been used to help patrol 
the U.S./Mexico border and to assist the Customs Service in 
searching shipping containers, as traffickers sought to find 
more effective transhipment alternatives to aerial and 
maritime methods. (Getier, 1993) 
Considerable concern about negative aspects of military 
drug enforcement participation continues to this day. Some of 
the concern relates to interagency coordination gaps and 
overlapping areas that still exist and cause inefficiencies or 
problems with unity of effort. These may be partially the 
result of the lack of overall authority and control of assets 
during operations for DOD or any other agency. A 1993 GAO 
report concluded that the costs of the military's drug control 
efforts outweighed their effectiveness. These conclusions 
were based upon law enforcement apprehension capabilities that 
did not match the surveillance output of military efforts and 
the continued availability of low-priced cocaine on U.S. 
streets. Additionally, the report stated that drug 
enforcement operations caused a degradation of military 
readiness and placed extra morale and maintenance burdens on 
personnel and resources. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220) 
DOD disputed the readiness charges and contended that 
crews involved in counterdrug operations still meet all annual 
training requirements. Military leaders also maintained that 
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the anti-narcotics missions are just part of the overall 
operational tempo necessary for readiness (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93- 
220) . 
Recent changes have attempted to address the coordination 
issues. In 1994, the Commandant of the Coast Guard was 
appointed to the newly created position of U.S. Interdiction 
Coordinator with responsibility for the whole national 
interdiction effort. Additionally, the joint task forces were 
reorganized and renamed as Joint Interagency Task Forces 
(JIATFs). Most importantly, the JIATF leaders now have 
tactical control of other agency's assets, which should bring 
about a more "seamless" detection, monitoring, interdiction, 
and seizure effort (Thomas, 1994). With regard to those who 
maintain that the military has had little real impact, many 
feel that drug traffickers are being forced to undertake more 
expensive and indirect shipping methods (Getier, 1993). 
However, considering the profit margins involved, interdiction 
alone will not win the war, and it is only one part of 
America's anti-drug effort. The reduction of demand for drugs 
is perhaps the most important element of the strategy. 
(Dorsey, 1992) 
Despite the lack of consensus on how to wage the Drug 
War, there appears to be little doubt about the high level of 
performance by military personnel. Representative Charles 
Rangel voiced this point succinctly when he stated that "the 
U.S. military was reluctant to get involved in this thing 
[anti-drug campaign] .... But, since they've accepted the 
mission, they've done a fantastic job in converting wartime 
technology to assist local, state and federal law 
enforcement." (Getier, 1993, p. 73) Regardless of where one 
falls in the broad spectrum of arguments over source country 
solutions, interdiction, education and reduction of demand, or 
even legalization, one fact appears clear:  U.S. military 
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participation in the War on Drugs is another example of the 
military answering the call for a non-traditional mission. 
2.  A Flood of Migrants 
The September 1991 military coup in Haiti that ousted 
President Aristede resulted in a large upsurge in Haitian 
refugees seeking to immigrate to the U.S. via boat. While 
U.S. policy has changed with time, it basically aimed at 
interdicting the Haitian vessels, interviewing the refugees, 
and repatriating those without a basis for asylum. Because of 
the massive numbers of Haitians attempting to reach America, 
DOD assets and personnel participated in the efforts as part 
of what became known as Operation Able Manner. (Parker, 1993) 
A refugee camp was established at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), 
Cuba and supported by DOD personnel for the overflow of 
refugees being processed. This activity became known as 
Operation Guantanamo and included Army Reserve volunteers in 
addition to an active-duty civil affairs battalion (Reserve 
Forces Policy Board, 1993). U.S. Marines were embarked on 
some Coast Guard cutters as security detachments to provide 
added assistance. Navy ships assisted in the interdiction 
efforts as well. More than 31,000 Haitian refugees were 
interdicted in 1992 with over 13,000 in May alone. In 
response, the U.S. adopted a policy of repatriating all 
Haitian refugees to deter attempted voyages (Parker, 1993). 
However, the Haitian exodus continued. 
Between February and March 1993, the military assisted 
other agencies involved in a case of Chinese refugees seeking 
to illegally immigrate to the U.S. Nearly 150 tons of cargo 
was transported between Hawaii and Kwajalein to support the 
care and feeding of the 535 Chinese while the diplomatic 
procedures to resolve the situation were in process. (Air 
Mobility Command Office of History, 1995) 
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In the Caribbean, the Navy hospital ship Comfort was put 
into service as an initial Haitian refugee processing center 
and preliminary medical treatment center. Also, a 50-bed Air 
Force Air Transportable Hospital was brought to GTMO to help 
provide care for the refugees there (Gunby, 1994). In June 
1994, the U.S. sent additional military personnel to GTMO to 
manage the growing refugee camps. Almost 3,900 Army troops 
were deployed to GTMO by November (Eklund, 1995). Part of 
this increase was due to the arrival of Cuban refugees in 
addition to the Haitians. 
As a result of social unrest and policy statements of the 
Castro regime in Cuba, a large number of Cubans boarded rafts 
and vessels of all description to sail for America. As the 
number of refugees increased, the Clinton administration 
announced on August 20, 1994 that the Cuban refugees or 
"balseros" would no longer be granted political asylum and 
allowed into the U.S. Refugee camps for the Cubans were 
constructed in GTMO in addition to the existing Haitian camps. 
The "balseros" who were interdicted were sent to GTMO, and ten 
Navy ships were involved in the efforts. (U.S. Department of 
State, 1994) 
By early September of 1995 more than 14,000 Cuban 
refugees had joined 14,000 Haitian refugees in GTMO, and the 
size of the Cuban camps had been expanded to house a total of 
more than 50,000 balseros (Church, 1994). Later in September, 
the first of some 8,500 Cuban refugees were sent from GTMO to 
four camps in Panama because of overcrowding at the base in 
Cuba (Washington Times, 1995). 
Additionally, in October 1994, over 200 Army personnel 
went to Surinam as part of Operation Distant Haven. They 
opened and ran a refugee camp for more migrant refugees that 
had been in GTMO (Eklund, 1995). In December, thousands of 
Cuban refugees at two of the camps in Panama rioted because of 
frustration over U.S. refusal to permit them to come to 
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America, and some soldiers were injured. Coupled with a 
request from Panama to have all of the refugees out of the 
country by March 6th, more soldiers were scheduled to be sent 
to GTMO and Panama in January 1995. Twelve hundred soldiers 
were to deploy to Panama and another 1,800 to GTMO to provide 
extra security for the movement of the refugees. (Washington 
Times, 1995) 
The returning Cuban refugees were to join 2 0,000 Cuban 
and 3,500 Haitian refugees still in GTMO. However, plans were 
being made to return the Haitian refugees to their home 
country since President Aristide had been returned to power. 
(Washington Times, 1995) 
Discussions for solutions to the refugee problem are 
still underway. The latest turn of events was the May 2, 1995 
announcement of a new Cuban refugee policy by the Clinton 
administration. Under this new policy, all of the nearly 
20,000 Cuban refugees in GTMO would be allowed into the U.S. 
with the exception of roughly 500 people who will be returned 
to Cuba because of either criminal records or some other 
disqualifying factor (Matthews, 1995). Future "balseros" will 
be returned to Cuba. 
After the current population of Cuban refugees are moved 
to either the U.S. or Cuba and the remaining Haitians are 
returned to Haiti, DOD should be able to shut down the GTMO 
refugee camps. This will save an estimated $1 million a day 
in operating costs and release nearly 6,000 U.S. armed forces 
members now in GTMO to help manage the refugee camps 
(Matthews, 1995). However, when the instability and strife in 
some regions of the world are considered, it is clear that the 
migrant interdiction chapter of the U.S. military's non- 
traditional mission history is not yet finished. 
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C.   DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE 
1.  Civil-Military Cooperative Action Program 
In 1992, Senator Sam Nunn introduced legislation aimed at 
using the military to help meet domestic needs. His proposal 
sought to utilize the armed forces in civilian projects 
compatible with training for their primary military missions. 
At the same time, the civil-military activities would aid 
American society while building unit morale and cohesion. 
(Nunn, 1993) 
Senator Nunn's program was based upon the following three 
"essential" principles: 
• projects would conform with the mission of the 
specific unit involved; 
• projects would fill needs not being otherwise met, and 
not be in competition with services provided by 
private or government organizations; and 
• projects could not be used to justify extra funding or 
personnel retention. (Nunn, 1993) 
Additionally, Nunn's program would seek to fill the 
following six objectives: 
• enhance personal and unit training and morale through 
participation in significant community activities; 
• encourage civil-military cooperation; 
• foster equal opportunity and reduce racial problems 
and conflict; 
• assist civil sector through use of military 
technological and manpower skills; 
• advance local ecological, economic and social 
conditions in vicinity of military bases; and 
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• expand job, training, education, and recreation 
opportunities for disadvantaged youths and citizens. 
(Nunn, 1993) 
Finally, Senator Nunn saw the military providing 
assistance by serving as role models, repairing civilian 
facilities and infrastructure, implementing a National Guard 
Youth Corps, and providing summer jobs, job training and 
education, medical transport, public health outreach programs, 
and nutritional assistance (Nunn, 1993). Senator Nunn summed 
up his proposal as follows: 
Nothing gives military people more pride than 
carrying out a mission of humanity, a mission of 
peace, a mission of mercy. This is something they 
enjoy doing. It gives them tremendous satisfaction 
and it's something they do well. (Nunn, 1993, pp. 
12-13) 
The fiscal 1993 Defense Authorization Act established the 
Civil-Military Cooperative Action Program; and, in June 1993, 
the Secretary of Defense created a Directorate for Civil- 
Military Programs under the Assistant Secretary for Reserve 
Affairs to implement the program. In October 1993, Congress 
approved roughly $78 million for fiscal 1994 and $80 million 
for fiscal 1995 for two types of pilot projects. (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995) 
The first type mainly involves job training and education 
efforts that aid the community without decreasing military 
readiness. These programs would be funded by specific 
appropriation and benefit the armed forces through improved 
specialty and leadership skills. To date, seven education and 
job training-related programs affecting more than 3 0 states 
have been funded and instituted. These projects include 
ChalleNGe, Starbase (also offshoots Starbase Atlantis and 
Starbase Kelly), Youth Conservation Corps and Urban Youth 
Corps, Seaborne Conservation Corps, Civil Air Patrol Falcon 
Flight Program, Community and Service Leadership Camp, and the 
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National Civilian Community Corps (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995). These job training and 
education programs are described in more detail in Appendix C. 
The Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) Career 
Academies are another example of a civil-military education 
program currently in existence. However, this program is 
funded by the President's Defense Conversion and Reinvestment 
Initiative of 1993 instead of the Civil-Military Programs 
Directorate. The JROTC Career Academies look to support 
transition assistance in cities hurt by base closures and 
military downsizing. They employ retired military personnel 
as teachers and administrators and seek to provide "at risk" 
high school students with skills development, discipline, 
responsibility, and values (Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Reserve Affairs, 1995). This program is also described in 
more detail in Appendix C. 
The second type of civil-military program is aimed at 
meeting community health care or infrastructure needs as part 
of military training. These efforts would either use 
volunteers or be funded from the DOD training budget with 
little impact on operational funding. The projects would 
benefit military personnel by allowing a training reguirement 
to be met in a more realistic environment. (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995) 
A total of nine programs, combining either military 
training or volunteer efforts with domestic assistance, were 
approved for fiscal 1994 and fiscal 1995. (Only eight are 
discussed here since one of the programs, Sea Partners, is run 
by the Coast Guard Reserve and this paper concentrates on DOD 
initiatives.) These programs have been implemented in over 34 
states and have, as an incentive, received funding support 
from the Civil-Military Programs Directorate for some 
incremental costs. The joint military training/civil 
assistance programs include GuardCare, Merlin, CAREFORCE, Arch 
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Angel, Reef-Ex, Operation KotzebueCare, Winslow, and a project 
involving the Fourth Cliff Family Recreation Area (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995). These 
programs are described in greater detail in Appendix C. 
In fulfilling the reguirements of the program tasking, 
the different services examine mission validity with respect 
to training, domestic needs, and cost-effectiveness. Project, 
geographic, and force structure diversity, potential for 
short-term completion along with sustainable growth, and 
conformity with other government and private efforts are also 
investigated. (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve 
Affairs, 1995) 
Although it is too early to determine the long-term 
success of these programs, they do seem to show promise. It 
appears that a concerted effort is being put forth to properly 
coordinate and operate these programs within legal guidelines 
and the initial vision for the efforts. If these programs are 
able to provide guality military training, build civil- 
military bonds, and address domestic needs without degrading 
readiness, they will indeed provide "double duty" dollars to 
the American taxpayer. Additionally, the new civil-military 
programs have a successful precedent in the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC), which is briefly described in 
Chapter II. The CCC was essentially a youth employment 
program, and the Army played a major role in its 
administration. The CCC helped to preserve the nation's 
natural resources and has been heralded as one of the greatest 
social action successes of the federal government (Sherraden, 
1981). 
President Clinton asked for $76 million for the Civil- 
Military Cooperation Action program for fiscal 1996. The new, 
Republican-controlled Congress has sought to cut the program 
entirely as the fiscal  1996 defense budget is debated 
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(Scarborough, 1995).  As the saying goes, only time will tell 
whether the new initiatives can be as successful as the CCC. 
2.  Disaster Relief 
Since 1989, a number of major disasters have occurred in 
the U.S. or in U.S. concerns. The role of the military, 
particularly that of the active-duty components, has increased 
as well. Between 1989 and 1992, for example, more than 11,000 
active-duty members participated in disaster relief efforts 
(Kelly, 1992). The continuing National Guard response to 
domestic disasters can be viewed in Appendix A. 
The Exxon Valdez disaster in March 1989 was the largest 
and most damaging oil spill in America's history. Despite a 
lack of experience in spill cleanup operations, the Army Corps 
of Engineers deployed two dredges to Alaska that were 
instrumental in oil recovery efforts (McDonnell, 1992). The 
Air Force supplied airlift support for the task (Military 
Airlift Command Office of History, 1991). 
In addition to the usual National Guard forest fire- 
fighting actions, the Air Force carried the equivalent of 150 
C-141 aircraft cargo loads to provide personnel and equipment 
support to the efforts in 1989 (Department of the Air Force, 
1990) . Four active-duty battalions were used to help the 
Boise Interagency Fire Control battle fires in Oregon and 
Idaho (Kelly, 1992). 
In fiscal 1990, members of the armed forces aided 
communities in South Carolina and the surrounding areas 
following Hurricane Hugo (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1991). 
During these endeavors, the Air Force airlifted 300 C-141 
aircraft equivalent loads of supplies and personnel to the 
region (Department of the Air Force, 1990). Over 3,000 
active-duty personnel from all four branches of the armed 
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forces took part in Hurricane Hugo relief response (Kelly, 
1992) . 
Also in fiscal 1990, the military provided assistance to 
the San Francisco area after the Loma Prieta earthquake (U.S. 
National Guard Bureau, 1991). Included in this aid was 
extensive participation by the Army Corps of Engineers. The 
Corps of Engineers performed damage assessment surveys and 
administered contracts for construction and repair work 
(McDonnell, 1993) . 
Concern about the response of the federal government to 
Hurricane Hugo in 1989 led FEMA to develop a revised Federal 
Response Plan. Unveiled early in 1992, the Federal Response 
Plan is set up to respond to all types of natural and man-made 
emergencies. (Stoll, 1994) 
The Federal Response Plan assigns disaster relief 
responsibilities to 2 6 federal agencies and the American Red 
Cross and describes available assistance. As in the 
"Catastrophic Earthquake" plan described in Chapter III, the 
duties are divided into twelve different Emergency Support 
Functions (ESFs). DOD is the lead agency for Public Works and 
Engineering (ESF 3) and for Urban Search and Rescue (ESF 9) 
and has support-agency responsibilities for the other ten 
functions. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180) 
During fiscal 1992, there were 54 presidentially-declared 
emergencies, and DOD participated in relief efforts for eight 
of them. The most significant of these were Hurricane Andrew, 
which struck Florida and Louisiana; Typhoon Omar, which 
damaged Guam; and Hurricane Iniki, which hit the Hawaiian 
island of Kauai. All three natural disasters occurred within 
a three-week period in August and September of 1992, with 
damage estimated at over $25 billion. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180) 
The National Guard was called out by the states (and 
Guam) in all cases, and active duty military were a part of 
the federal disaster response.   The most severe damage 
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occurred in Florida, and that state also received the largest 
amount of DOD support. Nearly 25,000 Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and Marine Corps personnel as well as over 5,000 Florida 
National Guardsmen supported Hurricane Andrew relief efforts. 
The damage was less severe in the other locations, and DOD 
participation was roughly 400 members in Louisiana (over 300 
National Guard), nearly 800 in Guam (27 of which were National 
Guard), and more than 2,300 in Kauai (with slightly more than 
400 National Guard). The financial estimate for total costs 
incurred by DOD during these relief efforts was approximately 
$559 million. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180) 
In Florida, state and local authorities were overwhelmed 
by the degree of devastation, and the National Guard fulfilled 
both humanitarian and law enforcement roles for the first four 
days. After regular active-duty units arrived to take over 
the humanitarian assistance efforts, the Guard personnel 
performed largely law enforcement duties. In the other 
locations, the local civilian agencies were able to provide 
much of the relief support, and both active-duty and National 
Guard outfits furnished humanitarian assistance on a smaller 
scale. While the nature of military efforts varied by 
location, typical support included the provision and 
distribution of food, water, ice, temporary housing, medical 
services, and construction materials along with help in 
repairing structures and removal of debris (GAO 1993, NSIAD- 
93-180) . To list a few examples in Florida alone, the 
military cleared six million cubic yards of debris, provided 
medical care to 67,000 civilians, and repaired 98 schools 
(Mangual, 1993) . 
The military relief efforts were, for the most part, 
widely applauded. However, FEMA was faulted for inter-agency 
coordination problems that delayed assistance at times and for 
unresponsive damage and needs assessments (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93- 
180) .  As a result, some called for DOD to take over FEMA's 
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role in charge of disaster relief efforts. For example, 
Senator Bob Graham of Florida stated that "In the post-cold 
war era, this [command of disaster relief] could be an 
important new function for the military, not something done 
after hours, but as an ongoing significant part of the 
military task." (Booth, 1992, p. 42) 
Both DOD and the Government Accounting Office (GAO) feel 
that military responsibility for disaster response would not 
be well-advised. DOD has no desire to infringe upon the 
boundaries of civil authority over the military and offers the 
critical point that the armed services may not have the 
resources available to control or respond to disaster relief 
should they be involved in major combat or other operations at 
the same time (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180). Additionally, state 
and local governments are prepared to respond to most 
emergencies without federal assistance. Increasing the 
military's burden to include the oversight and coordination 
functions could lead to budget and readiness difficulties 
(Livingstone, 1992) . However, in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Andrew, a Bush administration official stated that the answer 
is not in expanding the military's role, but in improving FEMA 
and its ability to respond (Booth, 1992). To date, there has 
been no apparent shift in the general disaster response 
structure that would necessarily increase DOD involvement. 
Military officials stated that readiness was not 
adversely affected by participation in the Andrew, Omar, and 
Iniki relief efforts because of the relatively short-term 
deployments. Of the 50 Army-related military units involved 
in these operations (16 regular Army and 34 National Guard), 
41 reported readiness conditions either equal to or better 
than their status prior to the disasters. Of the other nine 
units (five Army and four Guard) where readiness decreased, 
the lower conditions were said to be "relatively 
insignificant"  and  not  directly  attributable  to  their 
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involvement in the disaster relief efforts. However, military 
officials also cautioned that longer-term commitments of 
personnel could have an adverse effect on readiness. (GAO 
1993, NSIAD-93-180, p. 24) 
DOD officials further stated that the combat support and 
combat service-support personnel involved in the relief 
efforts were engaged in actions "very compatible with the 
functions they would be expected to perform in war" and that 
the combat personnel had "the opportunity to hone their 
leadership and command and control skills." (GAO 1993, NSIAD- 
93-180, p. 24) 
The GAO report on DOD support for Andrew, Iniki, and Omar 
offered two suggestions for change. The first relates to 
existing legislation that severely limits the circumstances 
under which reserve personnel can be called up for disaster 
response. While individual reserve personnel may volunteer, 
section 637b (b) of title 10 of the U.S. Code prohibits 
activation of reserve units for disaster relief. The downside 
to the present situation is that, with the advent of the Total 
Force concept and subsequent service downsizing, most of the 
combat support and combat service-support forces are part of 
reserve units. As related earlier, it is these personnel who 
are best-trained to deal with situations akin to disaster 
relief and the fact that they are unavailable restricts DOD 
capability. DOD and Army Reserve officials support a 
provision that would improve their ability to utilize 
reservists. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180) 
The second recommendation deals with Stafford Act 
restrictions on reimbursement. Until the President officially 
declares a disaster and FEMA tasks DOD with action, units run 
the risk of not being reimbursed for the cost of any early 
preparations they make in anticipation of needed support. 
While DOD officials state that reimbursement is never the 
deciding factor in their decision-making process, it is a 
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consideration in these austere budgetary times. A change in 
the law that would allow DOD to receive funding for early 
action in instances where it is highly likely they will be 
involved would probably decrease post-disaster relief delays. 
(GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180) 
In 1993, DOD revised DOD Directive 3250.1 to consolidate 
action toward "Military Support to Civil Authorities." The 
revision was aimed at eliminating confusion between previously 
existing "Military Support to Civil Defense" (wartime) and 
"Military Assistance to Civil Authorities" (peacetime) 
programs. (Stoll, 1994) 
During fiscal 1993 flooding in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, and Wisconsin, over 10,000 National Guard personnel 
were supporting civil efforts at the peak of operations (U.S. 
National Guard Bureau, 1993). Military satellites were also 
used to help track Mississippi River floodwaters. In January 
1994, the military provided aid to thousands of victims of the 
Northridge earthguake in Los Angeles (Stoll, 1994). Later in 
1994, armed forces personnel responded to severe flooding in 
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, and Air National Guard C-130 
aircraft equipped with a modular airborne fire-fighting system 
were deployed for a record two months to help fight forest 
fires in Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington (U.S. 
National Guard Bureau, 1994) . 
Despite the controversies related above, the typical 
framework for current military disaster response remains as 
follows. If states or localities reguire more support than 
their governments can muster, state governors will normally 
first call in National Guard troops. However, DOD Directive 
3025.1 authorizes local military commanders to use personnel 
and resources in "immediate response" to disaster situations 
for the prevention of damage and saving of lives and property 
(Stoll, 1994, p. 10). If the disaster is severe enough, the 
President will declare an "official" disaster and FEMA will 
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appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to coordinate 
federal response. If requested through FEMA, military forces 
will then provide primary or support assistance under the 
direction of the FCO (Stoll, 1994) . No changes have been made 
to the rules governing the participation of reserve personnel 
in disaster response. 
D.   MISCELLANEOUS DOMESTIC PROPOSALS 
The National Guard continued to provide control for 
various civil disturbances. Assistance to local law 
enforcement agencies during the 1992 riots in Los Angeles 
(U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1992) and supplying equipment to 
federal agencies involved in the Branch Davidian episode in 
Waco, Texas in 1993 are but two examples (U.S. National Guard 
Bureau, 1993). In fiscal 1994, National Guard personnel in 
Puerto Rico spent more than 139,000 person-days to help combat 
crime (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1994). See Appendix A for 
an overview of continued National Guard domestic aid efforts. 
In addition to the major initiatives and actions detailed 
in the previous two sections, there have been a number of 
other calls for domestic use of the military in recent years. 
Among these was a request by Sharon Pratt Kelly, then mayor of 
Washington, D.C., for National Guard assistance in combatting 
crime in her city. 
In 1993, in an effort to reduce violent crime in 
Washington, D.C., Mayor Kelly worked with her city council and 
police department to compose a 16-point Violence Reduction 
Strategy. One of the points called for increasing "the level 
of support and expand[ing] the role of the National Guard in 
local law enforcement and crime prevention activities." 
(Kelly, 1994, p. 22) While mainly related to cracking down on 
the drug problem, the proposal called for the Guard to provide 
special lighting in areas identified with high levels of drug 
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activity, support drug enforcement operations with aerial and 
ground surveillance and reconnaissance, seal up abandoned 
buildings known to harbor drug dealing activities, set up 
roadblocks and augment the police in drug operations, provide 
technical and administrative support to the police department, 
and aid a community youth education program. (Kelly, 1994) 
The National Guard had already been involved in several 
of these programs on a limited basis, but Mayor Kelly was 
requesting Presidential or Congressional authorization for 
control over the Guard similar to that permitted to state 
governors. Her request was denied by President Clinton 
because of legal restrictions on his ability to delegate 
Presidential authority. (Kelly, 1994) 
Another example of a request for DOD civic-military 
assistance occurred in 1993. Congressmen McCandless and 
Traficant introduced legislation aimed at authorizing DOD 
personnel to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
and Customs Service in the performance of "border patrol- 
related activities." (Baranzini, 1993, p. 11) 
In the aftermath of the 1995 bombing of the federal 
building in Oklahoma City, the Clinton administration has 
suggested using the military in an increased domestic anti- 
terrorism role. While the White House appears interested in 
utilizing armed forces expertise in chemical and biological 
weaponry, the mere idea of using the military has caused 
considerable consternation about posse comitatus violations 
and the like. CBaltimore Sun, 1995) 
E.   PEACE OPERATIONS 
The world has seen a quantum increase in peace operations 
in the short time period following the end of the Cold War. 
Some attribute this increase to the thawing of barriers in the 
U.N. Security Council that had previously prevented agreements 
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allowing U.N. action to be taken (Linn, 1994) . As an 
illustration, since 1948 the U.N. has initiated 36 
peacekeeping missions; however, 2 3 of those were begun after 
mid-1988. In 1988, there were five U.N. peacekeeping 
operations in existence. As of March 1995, 16 are currently 
active. (Browne, 1995) 
This section will illustrate U.S. military involvement in 
peace operations after 1989. As a preface to this discussion, 
definitions of the types of missions that fall under the 
banner of peace operations and the manner of their execution 
will be helpful. 
While the word peacekeeping has been used generically to 
describe participation in any manner of peace-related 
operations, the term "peace operations" may be more 
appropriate. This term has come to represent a wide spectrum 
of missions. These include preventive deployments to keep 
conflict from breaking out, peacekeeping to monitor cease- 
fires with the consent of both sides, and peace enforcement to 
compel nations or factions to end a conflict. (GAO 1995, 
NSIAD-95-102BR) 
Other terms include peacemaking, which would involve 
diplomacy before preventive deployments were necessary, and 
peacebuilding, which would involve post-conflict action to 
strengthen the situation and prevent the scenario from 
deteriorating back toward strife (Allen and others, 1993). 
Humanitarian operations are included in some definitions, but, 
in this paper, these missions will be discussed in the 
humanitarian assistance section. 
The execution of peace operations falls into three 
categories. These are U.N.-led, non-U.N.-led but Un- 
authorized, and those independent of the U.N. The peace 
operations in Bosnia are an example of U.N.-led peacekeeping. 
The U.S. intervention in Haiti was a coalition led by the 
U.S., but fully-authorized by the U.N. The long-standing MFO 
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peacekeeping operation in the Sinai is run by the U.S. and 
representative of a peacekeeping mission independent of the 
U.N. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR) 
Peace operations within the peacemaking, preventive 
deployment, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding categories are 
"generally noncombat operations to monitor an existing 
agreement, undertaken with consent of all major belligerent 
parties and conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations 
charter." (Wisner, 1993, p. 1) Peace enforcement missions are 
"armed intervention, involving all necessary measures to 
compel compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions and 
conducted under Chapter VII of the [U.N.] charter." (Wisner, 
1993, p. 1) 
1.  The Growth of U.S. Involvement in Peace Operations 
In 1989, the only peace operations U.S. military 
personnel were involved with were the U.N. UNTSO mission in 
the Middle East and the U.S.-led MFO in the Sinai. At that 
time, guidance for American contributions to U.N. peace 
actions was set forth by the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, 
as amended. This regulation stated that a maximum of 1,000 
U.S. military personnel could be "detailed to the United 
Nations in noncombat roles to help peacefully resolve 
disputes." (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR, p. 8) 
Since 1989, U.S. military personnel have been a part of 
eight new U.N.-led peace operations. A historical overview of 
American involvement in U.N. peace operations can be seen in 
Appendix D. The U.S. military also led U.N.-authorized 
operations in Somalia and Haiti, and, in several instances, 
provided airlift or other support to operations in which the 
U.S. was not otherwise actively engaged. Additionally, U.S. 
air and naval forces served in blockade or sanction operations 
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such as Deny Flight in Bosnia and Southern Watch in Southern 
Iraq. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR) 
In June 1992, the Secretary-General of the U.N., Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, spoke to the U.N. Security Council about his 
vision for increasing U.N. ability to bring about peace and 
stability. Among his desires were more control of U.N. 
military operations through a revitalized U.N. Military Staff 
Committee, a U.N. commanded standing military force for U.N. 
use (under Article 43 of the U.N. charter) , and better funding 
and logistics avenues to allow the U.N. to complete actions 
undertaken. (Lewis, 1993) 
Between August and October 1992, the military provided 
support to Operation Provide Transition in Angola. Following 
negotiations that ended a 16 year-long civil war, Air Force 
aircraft transported Angolan soldiers to their homes before 
scheduled national elections. In a similar operation in May 
1993, U.S., Australian, Indonesian, and Namibian personnel and 
peacekeeping forces were transported to Cambodia to oversee 
Cambodia's first free elections in 40 years. (Air Mobility 
Command Office of History, 1995) 
In September 1992, President Bush addressed the U.N. 
General Assembly and supported the need for U.N. member-states 
to train personnel for peacekeeping duties, but he maintained 
the existing U.S. position that individual governments should 
have the final say on whether their soldiers would be used. 
President Bush also stated that U.S. military communications, 
intelligence, logistics, and transportation forces would be 
available to assist U.N. peacekeeping units. (Lewis, 1993) 
In November 1992, a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) 
unit became operational in Zagreb to provide medical support 
to the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) operation 
in the former Yugoslavia. This action marked the first 
instance where an entire U.S. unit served under U.N. control. 
In July 1993, Army personnel deployed to Macedonia to take 
63 
part in a peacekeeping effort to patrol the border between 
Albania and Serbia and deter the spillover of conflicts in the 
region. Over 800 U.S. troops are now involved as part of 
UNPROFOR. (Browne, 1995) 
U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in December 1992 as part 
of Operation Restore Hope (Eklund, 1995) . This mission had 
begun as a humanitarian relief effort (Provide Relief), with 
air delivery of food starting in August (Air Mobility Command 
Office of History, 1995). However, the operation became a 
peace enforcement mission, so it will be included in this 
section. 
Before the U.S. forces were inserted into Somalia, the 
Air Force transported Pakistani members of the U.N.-led UNOSOM 
I peacekeeping mission into the country in September (Air 
Mobility Command Office of History, 1995). The U.S. 
deployment in Somalia became part of the U.N.-authorized, but 
U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) aimed at establishing a 
safe environment for the humanitarian relief actions. In May 
1993, UNITAF ceased operations and was replaced by the U.N. 
UNOSOM II mission. UNOSOM II's maximum authorized personnel 
strength of 28,000 included 2,833 U.S. troops from logistics 
and administrative units. (Browne, 1995) 
Tensions between different factions in Somalia and U.N. 
forces increased. In August 1993, 400 Army Rangers were sent 
to the country in response to the violence directed at U.N. 
peacekeepers. Following a battle between a group of the 
Rangers and forces belonging to Somalian warlord Mohamed 
Aideed in early October, an additional 1,3 00 troops were 
rushed to Somalia along with M-l tanks and Bradley fighting 
vehicles (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995). 
However, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in one battle on October 
3rd. Although over 17,000 more personnel were sent to the 
area initially, as American public opinion turned against the 
U.S. intervention in Somalia, President Clinton announced that 
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all but several hundred support troops would leave Somalia by 
the end of March 1994 (Roos, 1993). On March 25, 1994, the 
last U.S. military forces left Somalia (Air Mobility Command 
Office of History, 1995). UNOSOM II ceased operations a year 
later in March 1995 (Browne, 1995). 
The loss of American life in Somalia cast a large shadow 
upon the heretofore rapid rise in the popularity and support 
of U.S. involvement in peace operations. Questions concerning 
what types of peace operations to participate in, what 
conditions to insert U.S. troops under, and what limitations 
to place upon the "tangible and intangible costs" of the 
missions began to abound (Roos, 1993, p. 13). After a visit 
to Somalia in the wake of the U.S. casualties, Congressman 
Robert Dornan called attention to the potential loss of 
American prestige and lack of a clearly evident mission 
inherent in U.N. peace actions. Some called for a "broader 
reassessment of the costs of U.S. involvement in U.N. 
operations." (Roos, 1993, p. 13) 
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal 1994 
and 1995 limited the U.N. contribution assessed to the U.S. to 
25 percent of U.N. operation costs, as of fiscal 1996. This 
legislation also placed peace operation reporting requirements 
on the President, and it required the President to notify 
Congress 15 days before the U.S. would provide peacekeeping 
assistance to the U.N. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR) 
In an effort to reform U.N. peace operations and set 
policy for U.S. participation, President Clinton issued 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) in May 1994. The 
goal of PDD-25 was to "ensure that UN missions have clear and 
realistic objectives, that peacekeepers are equipped properly, 
that money is not wasted, and that an end-point to UN action 
can be identified." (U.S. President, 1995, p. 17) The major 
issues addressed in PDD-2 5 can be summarized as follows: 
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• Ensure disciplined choices about which peace 
operations to support and when to involve U.S. 
personnel; 
• Reduce U.S. costs for U.N. peace operations; 
• Reaffirm long-standing U.S. policy that U.S. forces 
involved in U.N. peace operations may be placed under 
the temporary operational control of a U.N. commander, 
but the U.S. will never relinquish command of U.S. 
personnel; 
• Reform and strengthen U.N. capability to manage peace 
operations effectively; 
• Improve the manner in which the U.S. government 
manages and funds peace operations; and 
• Improve cooperation between the Executive Branch, the 
Congress, and the American public with regard to peace 
operations. (U.S. President, 1995, p. 17) 
On September 8, 1994, U.S. forces entered Haiti as part 
of a successful multi-national (although largely U.S.) force 
to restore exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to 
power (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995) . Peak 
Army strength was over 18,000 in October 1994 (Eklund, 1995). 
This mission, known first as Operation Uphold Democracy and 
then as Operation Maintain Democracy, was transferred to 
United Nations control in April 1995. (Air Mobility Command 
Office of History, 1995) 
As of March 6, 1995, there were 1,139 members of the U.S. 
military serving under U.N. control in peace operations 
(Browne, 1995). The locations of these personnel are detailed 
below in Table 5. However, as of January 1, 1995, there were 
2 5 other nations contributing more troops to U.N. peacekeeping 
than the U.S. (U.S. President, 1995). 
According to a GAO report released in February 1995, DOD 
had incurred incremental costs of $1.9 billion for peace 
operations in fiscal 1994. Although this figure also included 
the cost of humanitarian assistance such as the mission in 
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Table 5.  U.S. Military Personnel Under U.N. Control 
as of March 6, 1995 
Operation Total Number 
UNTSO (Middle East) 17 
UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait) 15 
MINURSO (Western Sahara) 30 
UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia) 861 
UNMIH (Haiti) 212 
UNOMIG (Georgia) 4 
TOTAL 1,139 
Source: From Marjorie Ann Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues 
for Congress," Congressional Research Service Issue Brief 
IB90103, 21 March 1995, p. 5. 
Iraq, it specified expenditures of $528 million in Somalia and 
$371 million in Haiti. The GAO estimate for fiscal 1995 DOD 
peace operation costs was $2.1 billion. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95- 
102BR) 
The GAO report also expressed concern about the funding 
mechanism for American involvement in peace operations. DOD 
budgets so as to be prepared to act, but it does not 
specifically budget for the costs of an operation or 
contingency. Therefore, when DOD uses its forces in an 
operation, the costs are either paid for out of existing 
operations and maintenance funding or recouped through 
supplemental appropriations. The danger inherent in this 
method is that DOD may not be able to pursue necessary planned 
activities because of peacekeeping or other contingency 
operations. Another factor in the budget equation is that the 
U.N. only reimburses the U.S. and other countries for 
participation in U.N.-led operations. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95- 
102BR) 
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Also, certain U.S. military units and resources have 
experienced greatly increased operational tempos as a result 
of the rise in peace operations. Combat readiness could 
decline unless the tempo is controlled or more reserve forces 
are utilized. Finally, the GAO raised concerns over the 
ability of DOD forces involved in a large peace operation to 
quickly respond to and be prepared for the sudden emergence of 
a Major Regional Conflict. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR) 
At this time, there are two major bills underway in 
Congress that would affect U.S. participation in peace 
operations. These are the Peace Powers Act of 1995, in the 
Senate, and the National Security Revitalization Act, in the 
House (Browne, 1995). This legislation is aimed at clarifying 
requirements for reports to Congress, controlling costs for 
DOD support of some U.N. actions, and requiring the President 
to certify that U.S. security interests are at stake when U.S. 
military forces are placed under the command or operational 
control of U.N. commanders (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR) . 
There have been calls for alternatives to the use of 
American armed forces in peacekeeping. For instance, some 
have called for the creation of an expanded Peace Corps to 
perform the function in a civilianized manner similar to that 
of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(CORDS) organization during the Vietnam War. The military 
would assume a support role providing transportation, 
logistics, and security assistance (Summers, 1993). On the 
other hand, some have suggested that certain military units 
receive training and be used specifically for peace operations 
(The Defense Monitor, 1995). 
In 1994, a number of changes in U.N. peace operation 
procedures were made. These included the establishment of a 
24-hour situation center at U.N. headquarters, streamlining of 
peace operation budgeting using DOD methodology, the 
appointment of an American as Under-Secretary General for 
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Administration and Management to implement reforms, and other 
actions to strengthen planning, logistics, legal protection, 
procurement, training and command capability (U.S. President, 
1995). President Clinton made the following statement about 
peace operations in February 1995: 
I have made UN peacekeeping reform a key goal, 
working to reduce costs and improve efficiency, 
using UN peacekeeping when it will work and 
restraining it when the situation is not ripe. 
More needs to be done to make UN peacekeeping 
realize it potential and more effectively serve our 
interests. It is in the U.S. interest to ensure UN 
peacekeeping works, and to improve it, because 
peacekeeping is one of the most effective forms of 
burdensharing available. Today, other nations pay 
more than two-thirds of the costs of peacekeeping 
and contribute almost 99% of the troops. Troops 
from seventy-seven nations are deployed throughout 
the world in the service of peace. (U.S. President, 
1995, p. 4) 
For the foreseeable future, peace operations are likely 
to be a continuing role for the U.S. military. The extent of 
this involvement remains to be seen in the wake of U.N.-reform 
efforts, public opinion, Congressional questions about the 
need for U.S. commitment overseas, and budget, force 
structure, and readiness concerns. 
2.  Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 
U.S. military forces continued to provide safety for U.S. 
citizens abroad through noncombatant evacuation operations 
(NEOs). In 1990, U.S. Marines operating from Navy amphibious 
ships assisted in a NEO to get U.S. citizens out of Liberia in 
the midst of unrest in that country. In January 1991, a U.S. 
amphibious force evacuated U.S. embassy and other personnel 
out of Mogadishu, Somalia. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1993) 
In October 1992, U.S. forces conducted two NEOs. The 
first involved the airlift of 96 U.S. citizens out of 
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Monrovia, Liberia because of conflict between different 
Liberian factions. Twenty-four of the people evacuated were 
U.S. embassy officials. The second NEO occurred in Tajikistan 
during fighting between forces supporting the acting president 
and those supporting the ousted president. Twelve U.S. 
embassy employees and nine foreign nationals were transported 
out of Dushanbe, Tajikistan. (Air Mobility Command Office of 
History, 1995) 
3.  international Military Education and Training 
As mentioned in Chapter II, DOD continues to provide 
assistance to other nations to this day. Some of the 
legislation which has affected this area are the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, the International Security Assistance 
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and the Support for East 
European Democracy Act of 1989. While the specific nature of 
the assistance has changed over time, it has largely been 
aimed at promoting democracy. (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83) 
Currently, the Security Assistance programs include 
Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education 
and Training (IMET), and Economic Support Funds (GAO 1992, 
GAO/NSIAD-92-248). Of these programs, IMET is of most 
interest. IMET was established by the aforementioned 
International Security and Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976 (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83) for the purposes of 
building relations between the U.S. and foreign countries. The 
State Department has responsibility for setting policy and 
general direction of the program, but DOD is charged with 
implementing IMET. (GAO 1992, GAO/NSIAD-92-248) 
Expenditures for IMET had averaged roughly $47 million to 
train about 5,000 people from approximately 100 foreign 
countries. As a result of the end of the Cold War, Congress, 
in fiscal 1991, amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
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with an expanded IMET initiative. The new IMET initiative was 
aimed at promoting civilian control over the military, 
managing defense resources, improving military justice 
systems, and fostering human rights. The initiative allowed 
the training of civilian personnel as well. (GAO 1992, 
GAO/NSIAD-92-248) 
Beginning in fiscal 1992, Eastern European and former 
Soviet Union countries became part of IMET for the first time. 
Also, Mobile Education Teams were established to bring the 
training to more individuals on site in the foreign nations. 
(GAO 1992, GAO/NSIAD-92-248) 
For fiscal 1993, about $47 million was spent on IMET, 
with $3.7 million specifically for the expanded IMET 
initiative (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83) . For fiscal 1994, IMET 
funding was cut to a little over $21 million although nearly 
$4 million was still earmarked for continuation of the 
expanded IMET. There have been some concerns about providing 
IMET to countries guilty of human rights violations, a lack of 
emphasis on IMET teaching of human rights principles, and 
redundancy between different foreign aid programs; however, 
IMET appears to be a victim of declining defense budgets more 
than anything else (Rosen and Purnell, 1994). GAO has 
reported a largely positive response from the countries 
receiving IMET (GAO 1992, GAO/NSIAD-92-248) and an increased 
DOD emphasis on refining the curriculums for the expanded IMET 
initiative (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83). 
Other recent program additions that may involve non- 
traditional missions include the CINC Initiative Fund, the 
Nunn-Lugar Initiative, and the George C. Marshall Center for 
Security Studies (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83). As an example, 
under the CINC Initiative, a Navy judge advocate recently 
spent six months in Albania helping to draft a new 
constitution and working on new military law standards (Rosen 
and Purnell, 1994). 
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F.   HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FOREIGN) 
The foreign humanitarian assistance programs are all now 
under the oversight and management of the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee 
Affairs (SecDef/H&RA) . Since the end of the Cold War, the 
four programs described in the previous chapter have continued 
and a new program (humanitarian demining) has been added. 
Additionally, the American Armed Services have become involved 
in several large, longer-term humanitarian aid operations such 
as Operation Provide Hope (former Soviet Union) and Operation 
Support Hope (Rwanda). An overview of Air Force Air Mobility 
Command participation in recent humanitarian assistance 
efforts can be seen in Appendix E. 
During this same time, some aspects of the humanitarian 
assistance programs have been criticized by the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) and have come under fire from 
Congress. Most of the complaints are related to perceptions 
of poor control of the programs and inefficient use of funds. 
Specific problem areas will be illustrated in the individual 
program discussions below. 
As a result, SecDef/H&RA and DOD have worked to improve 
the programs, particularly in the areas of cost control, 
record-keeping, and oversight. A humanitarian daily ration 
has been developed that provides a nutritionally appropriate 
alternative to delivery of the military meals ready-to-eat 
(MREs). The humanitarian daily ration can be produced for one 
third of the cost of an MRE. Goods are being shipped by 
surface transportation rather than more expensive airlift when 
immediate delivery is not critical. Also, improved budget 
oversight has been instituted and missions are prioritized to 
ensure the neediest situations related to national foreign 
policy are supported first. (Irvin, 1994) 
72 
1.  Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program 
In fiscal 1991, more than 8,000 National Guard personnel 
were deployed to Latin American to participate in the 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) program. Another 
10,000 troops were planned to train in HCA projects in 1993. 
The cost of consumable supplies and materials used in these 
civic assistance projects was $6.6 million in fiscal 1992 with 
$8.6 million estimated for 1993. (GAO 1994, T-NSIAD-94-158) 
A 1994 GAO report and testimony to Congress stated that 
it was difficult to track the costs of the program because DOD 
did not report personnel and transportation costs for units 
involved. GAO also found that some projects "were not 
designed to contribute to foreign policy objectives, did not 
appear to enhance U.S. military training, and either lacked 
the support of the country or were not used." (GAO 1994, T- 
NSIAD-94-158, p. 2) Additionally, DOD was criticized for 
failure to issue a required regulation for governing the 
program even though six years had passed since HCA 
authorization. Weaknesses in the approval process, project 
evaluation, and coordination between DOD, the State 
Department, and the Agency for International Development were 
also noted. (GAO 1994, T-NSIAD-94-158) 
In answer to the GAO report, SecDef/H&RA (which had only 
recently assumed responsibility for HCA) stated that the DOD 
regulation would be completed before the end of 1994. 
Additionally, SecDef/H&RA responded that DOD had recorded all 
HCA approvals in writing (some had previously been approved by 
telephone) since fiscal 1993, and, while evaluation and 
country need efforts were already in use, DOD was continuing 
to look into improving those processes. (Irvin, 1994) 
Perhaps more importantly, SecDef/H&RA emphasized the 
training benefits to the armed services of HCA and stressed 
that all HCA project proposals are screened by the relevant 
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service commands for their ability to meet training 
requirements. The personnel and transportation costs are 
reported as training costs because the deployments are viewed 
as training exercises. $5.8 million for HCA was included in 
the President's budget request for fiscal 1995. (Irvin, 1994) 
2.  Humanitarian Assistance Program 
Utilization of the excess property provisions of the 
Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) has grown with time. 
Between 1986 and 1992 over 57 million excess items were 
transferred by DOD. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
value of the items donated between 1986 and 1989 was roughly 
$49 million. Although figures are not available for the value 
of items donated since 1989, most of the excess items have 
been delivered since 1990. To illustrate this point, the 
costs of transporting the excess items to the foreign 
countries grew from $15 million in 1992 to $28 million in 
1993. (GAO 1994, T-NSIAD-94-158) 
The value of items donated since 1990 is unavailable 
because DOD's reporting requirement was eliminated. GAO was 
critical of this fact in a 1994 report and Congressional 
testimony because there was no record of these sizable 
donations of excess property. SecDef/H&RA is discussing 
reporting procedures with DOD logistics branches that would 
more accurately reflect the actual value of the transferred 
items. (GAO 1994, T-NSIAD-94-158) 
The funded transportation program continues to carry 
humanitarian goods also. In efforts to more efficiently use 
available funding, 95 percent of the material delivered in 
this program is now moved by surface transportation (Rourke, 
1995). 
In 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the U.S. 
military began providing assistance and protection to the 
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Kurdish people living in Northern Iraq. Between April and 
June of 1991 12,000 U.S. military personnel, mainly Army, were 
involved in these efforts. This mission became known as 
Operation Provide Comfort (Moskos, 1994). In 1994, the number 
of Army troops reached its zenith for the year in November at 
131 people in this on-going effort (Eklund, 1995). 
Operation Provide Hope involves transport of both 
privately donated and excess DOD property to the independent 
states of the former Soviet Union. Phase I of this continuing 
effort began in January 1992. In the month that Phase I 
lasted alone, nearly 4.5 million pounds of food and medicine 
were transported on 64 flights (Hogberg and Stone, 1993) . 
Between inception and April 1994 over 250 missions were 
executed by U.S. military forces. The excess property 
transferred includes bulk food, MREs, hospitals, and medical 
supplies. (Irvin, 1994) 
Smaller scale examples of recent excess property 
deliveries include the transfer of Bailey bridges to 
Mozambique to replace bridges destroyed in a civil war (Irvin, 
1994). Also, in August 1993, Bailey bridges were flown to 
Katmandu, Nepal to take the place of bridges wiped out by 
flooding (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995). 
Twenty-eight million dollars was appropriated for the HAP 
in fiscal 1993 and $48 million in fiscal 1994. However, $30 
million of the fiscal 1994 budget was set aside for the 
operation in northern Iraq, which had previously been funded 
by separate appropriation. This effectively reduced the 
actual availability of money for other HAP activities. (Irvin, 
1994) 
Under the funded transportation program in 1994, over $80 
million worth of humanitarian relief cargo was delivered in 24 
shipments. Sixteen shipments were made in the first quarter of 
1995. (Rourke, 1995) 
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The President's budget request for fiscal 1995 included 
$71.9 million for the HAP. Approximately $15 million was 
planned for use in northern Iraq. Of the remaining funds, $13 
million was intended for the SecDef/H&RA high-priority region 
of sub-Saharan Africa. (Irvin, 1994) 
3.  Denton Program 
Military support of the Denton program continued without 
change for the first few years of the post-Cold War period. 
However, during Desert Shield/Storm shipments were suspended 
(Rourke, 1995) . This was most likely due to the lack of 
available airlift since almost all of the Air Force's 
transport aircraft were involved in carrying war materials and 
personnel to and from the Gulf region. 
After the Gulf War ended the Air Force reassigned the two 
officers previously billeted to help manage the program. The 
amount of annual cargo carried under the Denton program 
dropped to an annual average of 200-300 thousand pounds for 
the next several years (Rourke, 1995). Despite this temporary 
drop in program utilization, a total of more than five million 
pounds of goods had been transported to 2 5 countries between 
the commencement of the program in 1985 and 1994 (Irvin, 
1994). 
In 1994, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (SecDef/H&RA) made 
efforts to revitalize and reemphasize the Denton Program. 
That year, 35 Denton program missions were flown to transport 
roughly 900,000 pounds of cargo to fourteen countries 
including the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Venezuela. 
SecDef/H&RA has continued a proactive stance towards the 
Denton program in 1995. In the first quarter of 1995, 25 
missions have been flown to carry 900,000 pounds of donated 
supplies to 16 countries.   Additionally, the SecDef/H&RA 
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Office has formed an informal partnership with the non-profit 
organization MAPS International to facilitate use of the 
program. (Rourke, 199 5) 
4.  Foreign Disaster Relief and Assistance 
Perhaps due to lesser control and stability resulting 
from the reduction in Cold War superpower tensions, the number 
of humanitarian emergencies in the world has increased 
significantly in recent years. By some measures, the number 
of humanitarian emergencies had grown to 17 in 1992 from an 
annual average of five during the 1978-1985 time span. In 
response to world and American demands, the U.S. has found 
itself more involved in attempts to stop or alleviate 
suffering (Irvin, 1994). As a result, in addition to 
continued disaster relief support, DOD has provided assistance 
in the aftermath of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and other 
results of regional instability. 
Operation Sea Angel was the name given to the flood 
relief provided to Bangladesh by DOD in 1991. All the 
services played a role in the response in May and June of 
1991, with 8,000 personnel involved at the peak of the 
operation. (Moskos, 1994) 
After the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Phillipines in 
1991, the Air Force evacuated personnel from the region in 
conjunction with Operation Fiery Vigil. More than 1,700 
sorties were flown to transport 23,400 people and 44,400 tons 
of cargo in this humanitarian evacuation. (Builder and others, 
1993) 
Operation Provide Promise began in July 1992 to assist 
victims of the conflict in Bosnia. Between then and April 
1994, DOD aircraft flew more than 5,000 sorties to bring 
relief supplies into Sarajevo and perform airdrop deliveries 
to isolated communities. Included among the material was over 
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50,000 metric tons of donated resources and 10 million DOD 
Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) or humanitarian daily rations. 
(Irvin, 1994) 
In December 1992, the Air Force transported over 400 tons 
of vehicles and equipment to Pakistan following flooding. In 
October 1993, relief supplies from the U.S. Office of Disaster 
Assistance were flown to Bombay, India following an earthquake 
that killed 11,000 people. (Air Mobility Command Office of 
History, 1995). 
Between May and September of 1994 over 23,000 tons of 
humanitarian relief supplies were flown into Tanzania and 
Uganda as part of Operation Support Hope. These missions were 
in support of Rwandan refugees who had fled a civil war in 
their country. (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995) 
In fiscal 1993, $50 million was appropriated for natural 
and man-made disaster relief to foreign nations. For fiscal 
1994, however, Congress authorized the use of money from the 
Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), which had previously 
been earmarked only for domestic disaster purposes. The 
President included a request for $46.3 million for foreign 
disaster relief in his fiscal 1995 budget request (Irvin, 
1994) . The fiscal 1995 funding was requested as a new 
appropriation so that the money would be retained in DERF for 
the purposes originally intended (U.S. Congress, House 1994). 
5.  Humanitarian Demining Program 
A fifth humanitarian assistance program has been 
established and is also under the oversight of the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and 
Refugee Affairs. Congress authorized ten million dollars for 
a humanitarian demining program in fiscal 1994. The need for 
this program was based on estimates that there are over ten 
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million land mines in use worldwide that injure or kill more 
than 150 people every week. (Irvin, 1994) 
Under the demining program, DOD and State Department 
personnel work with selected countries to develop programs 
that will educate local people on how to avoid land mines and 
train indigenous forces to locate and remove them. The larger 
aim of the humanitarian demining program is help countries to 
recover from conflict, rebuild economies, and allow refugees 
to return and resume farming in a more stable situation. 
(Irvin, 1994) 
Special Operations Forces personnel have been involved in 
demining and mine awareness training in Cambodia (Holmes, 
1995) . Thirteen Army service members deployed to Cambodia in 
October 1994 (Eklund, 1995). As part of their efforts, 
psychological operations members developed a comic book in the 
native Cambodian Khmer language so that children would know 
what to do if they came across an area with antipersonnel 
mines. (Holmes, 1995) 
In 1994, DOD assessment teams conducted demining program 
work in both Eritrea and Ethiopia. There were additional 
plans to expand the program to other locations in Africa and 
Latin America. (Irvin, 1994) 
In summary, the period from the end of the Cold War in 
1989 until the present was marked by extensive change in the 
world. As the United States has attempted to maintain its 
global leadership position while struggling to redefine 
policies and actions appropriate for new situations, the 
American military has been at the forefront of U.S. activities 
at home and abroad. 
Non-traditional missions have become a highly-charged 
topic as America tries to define and structure its military 
for the perceived needs of the future. A number of complex 
issues exist with considerable bearing on the subject of 
performing non-traditional missions.  The various facets of 
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the current non-traditional missions debate are discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter. 
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V.  ELEMENTS OF THE DEBATE:  PAST AS PRELUDE TO THE FUTURE 
The question of whether non-traditional missions are new 
to the military or, in fact, actually traditional has largely 
become a moot point. As an illustration, in December 1992 the 
National Defense University held a symposium called "Non- 
Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War 
Era." In the published proceedings of the conference, it was 
noted that a consensus had concluded that the symposium was 
"mistitled." Most participants agreed that the so-called 
"non-traditional" missions had been performed for over 200 
years and were, therefore, traditional. They decided that the 
discussion should have been more appropriately about "non- 
combat" roles. (Graham, 1993, pp. xii-xiii) 
However, the delineation of "combat" vs. "non-combat" may 
not go far enough. Perhaps a more accurate assessment is that 
offered by Carl Builder. 
What some have chosen to call the 
'nontraditional' or 'less traditional' missions for 
military forces are actually more traditional than 
the 'traditional' ones, and they are likely to 
become more common in the future. They should not 
be referred to as 'supporting' or 'humanitarian' 
missions because too many of them are much more 
than this. They have been called the 'noncombat' 
missions and the missions 'short of war,' but they 
can involve combat and can be undertaken during 
other people's wars. None of these labels is 
really correct. Yet these missions have always 
been an integral part of the American military 
heritage and were of rising interest and 
speculation within the American defense community 
even before the sudden collapse of Communism. 
There is a problem with terminology, and it is 
based on more than semantics. To assign names to 
these kinds of missions is to categorize them, and 
thereby to lend or deny them stature within the 
military services that perform them. If they were 
called 'secondary' missions to distinguish them 
from the 'primary' combat missions, this 
nomenclature  would  make  stature  differences 
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uncomfortably explicit: who wants to risk life, 
limb, or career for a secondary mission? Yet, to 
put them on an equal footing with the combat 
missions would lend them a stature that might 
undermine the established and zealously guarded 
hierarchical structures within all the American 
military services. Therein lies the most important 
clue to the future of these missions, and hence the 
subject to be examined. . . . Here, they will be 
called simply the 'other' missions, for they are 
other than the ones the American military services 
currently see as their principal purpose in being. 
But the distinctions were not always so important 
as they seem in the 1990s. (Builder, 1994, p. 225) 
At .this point, it would be constructive to combine 
Builder's thoughts with Huntington's "phases" of the U.S. 
military. Without much difficulty, Huntington's discussion 
can be viewed as a nation's military evolving to meet the 
needs of a changing nation. At times, this evolution has 
indeed made combat the primary focus of the armed forces. 
However, there have been periods when the military has been 
occupied primarily in roles unrelated to war. Cold War 
mentality aside, the previous three chapters of this thesis 
have painted a detailed picture of the extensive, consistent, 
and continuous involvement of the American military in non- 
traditional or "other," to use Builder's terminology, 
missions. 
A.   THE FIFTH MILITARY PHASE:  ENGAGEMENT 
Obviously, a new era or "phase" of American military 
focus is developing. Although in Chapter II, Table 1, the new 
fifth phase was left unnamed, calling this new period the 
"engagement" phase might be appropriate. In this sense, 
engagement means attending to needs in peacetime to decrease 
or prevent unrest or the use of force in the future (Brehm and 
Gray, 1992) . Engagement reflects the wide variety of missions 
the U.S. military is involved in as America strives, in its 
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own way, to make the nation and the world safer and more 
stable in the absence of a discernable military threat. 
Given the history and present status of non-traditional 
missions in the U.S. military, the question is how large and 
prominent a role should these "other" missions play in this 
new phase? 
To clearly evaluate the future of non-traditional 
missions, one must look at more than just the recent past. 
The limited viewpoints expressed by those whose living memory 
spans the mere forty or fifty years of the Cold War fail to 
consider the broad legacy of the American military. By 
examining the present in the context of a rich and varied 
past, the future of the U.S. armed forces may be glimpsed. 
This chapter examines different facets of this question 
regarding the future of non-traditional missions in the U.S. 
military. 
B.   STUMBLING BLOCKS 
The primary stumbling block to increased military 
involvement in non-traditional missions lies in the beliefs of 
the "new traditionalist" school, which concentrates on recent 
history at the expense of pre-Cold War events. Harry G. 
Summers, Jr., an advocate of tight control over non-combat 
uses of the military, has spoken of a "value system and a 
culture system within the armed forces of the United States" 
with the mission "to fight and win the nation's wars." 
(Summers, 1993, p. 69) This viewpoint is well-represented by 
the following quotation: 
The true purpose of the military is combat— 
specifically, defeating an enemy. . . . 
If the military changes its purpose and 
substitutes for its role as a combatant some less 
demanding activity, it will transform the 
organization. . . . 
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The moment such [non-traditional] missions 
become the military's purpose—or even its partial 
aim—the dangers and stress of combat will cease to 
guide our armed forces' training. (Cropsey, 1993, 
p. 77) 
Cropsey argues that combat training alone is what enables 
the military to perform well in non-traditional missions and 
that substitution of noncombat functions to preserve the 
military budget will merely turn DOD into just another federal 
agency (Cropsey, 1993). 
A June 1992 RAND workshop involving Air Force officers 
and aimed at exploring expanded noncombat mission capabilities 
experienced a deep division over the extent of American 
military participation in non-traditional missions. One 
segment of these officers felt that use of existing Air Force 
resources for these noncombat missions was permissible on an 
"as available" basis, but they were against any dedication of 
"training, force capabilities, personnel, or budget" for 
growth in this area (Builder and others, 1993, p. 63). 
This group was concerned that Congress would not fund 
these non-traditional activities and that money for combat 
training and preparation would suffer as a result. 
Additionally, these officers believed that noncombat 
operations would "dilute" or even "undermine" the 
professionalism needed for an effective fighting Air Force 
(Builder and others, 1993, p. 63). They saw the mission of 
the Air Force (although this picture is equally applicable to 
all the U.S. armed services) as fighting. These officers were 
fully prepared to have an Air Force with smaller resources 
concentrated on the wartime mission instead of a large force 
involved in noncombat operations at the expense of the primary 
mission (Builder and others, 1993). 
Steven Metz has enumerated the obstacles that he believes 
stand in the way of more effective U.S. military participation 
in peacekeeping, but, again, these issues are also relevant to 
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other non-traditional missions. According to Metz, attitude, 
training and education, and doctrine and planning must be 
addressed, and the national command authorities must 
demonstrate commitment to these missions for changes to occur. 
(Metz, 1993) 
Along these lines, a panel Of the 1992 National Defense 
University symposium on non-traditional missions offered the 
following recommendations: 
• Discard the notion that non-traditional missions are 
simply chores that must be undertaken. Non- 
traditional missions must be viewed as effective 
instruments of American policy formulation; 
• Non-traditional missions need to be addressed in U.S. 
national security policy; and 
• Doctrine for non-traditional missions has to be 
developed. (Graham, 1993, p. 124) 
An additional stumbling block is related to the natures 
of the services themselves. Carl Builder has proposed that 
the behavior of America's three major armed services can be 
explained by their institutional personalities. His premise 
is that the Navy's love of independence and tradition, the Air 
Force's love of flight and greater flying technology, and the 
Army's picture of itself as the servant of the nation underlie 
their respective strategies and actions. While not suggesting 
that the services place their own interests ahead of national 
security and national defense, Builder does believe that these 
"Masks of War" worn by the different military organizations 
stand as impediments to change as the services seek to 
maintain their own visions for existence and relevance. 
(Builder, 1989) 
Placed in today's context of reduced budgets and 
downsizing, these thoughts on the military's institutional 
personalities can be construed as follows: 
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Funding constraints may rein in the service 
acquisitions, but not their desires. They may have 
to do with lesser quantities, but they will 
continue to pursue the qualities they want in their 
institution and in the forces they are able to 
acquire. Congress may put them on a diet, but the 
services will retain their menu and their 
appetites. Moreover, the services tend to see such 
a diet as a temporary state of affairs—one that 
will change when the 'enemy' manifests itself or 
when the political winds shift again in their 
favor. Thus, funding restraints result in the 
services tightening their belts, but not losing 
their grips on their institutional identities or 
dreams. (Builder, 1989, pp. 202-203) 
These dreams of the individual services often pit one 
against the other. Examples of these inter-service rivalries 
abound. Air Force officials have been accused of seeking to 
maintain or gain missions from, or at the expense of, the 
other services throughout the ongoing Roles and Missions 
Commission (Glashow and Hölzer, 1995). However, other 
observers rightly claim that "none of the services have a 
monopoly on parochialism" and have illustrated the fact that 
all the services engage in this type of behavior (Cornell, 
1995, p. 12) . 
Clearly, large obstacles need to be overcome before non- 
traditional missions can become more accepted in the U.S. 
military. The next section discusses changes in America's 
concept of national security. Alternative viewpoints on non- 
traditional missions and appropriate use of the nation's armed 
forces are also presented. 
C.   NATIONAL SECURITY - THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
A White House document released in February 1995 had this 
to say about American national security: 
The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed 
America's security imperatives. The central 
security challenge of the past half century—the 
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threat of communist expansion—is gone. The 
dangers we face today are more diffuse. (U.S. 
President, 1995, p. 6) 
Samuel Huntington has stated "we now need the military 
policy and forces not to contain and deter an existing threat 
as we did during the Cold War but rather to prevent the 
emergence of a new threat." (Huntington, 1993, p. 7) To 
expand upon these thoughts, former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was quoted in a 1990 
Air Force white paper with the following statement about 
national security: 
To maintain this state of affairs [where the risk 
of global war between the superpowers remains low] , 
U.S. forces will protect U.S. security interests by 
providing the correct balance of military 
capabilities—forces capable of maintaining 
deterrence and protecting our national interests. 
As we search for that correct balance we can 
neither adopt the unrealistic assumption that 
nothing has changed, nor the historically naive 
presumption that everything has changed. 
(Department of the Air Force, 1990, pp. 2-3) 
The critical question to be answered is: What does 
national security mean? Put another way, how are our national 
interests defined? Is military responsibility for national 
security a narrowly-defined concept of fighting wars to keep 
America safe or something broader? 
In the regional conflicts so prevalent in the world 
today, some see the destruction of populations, land, and 
economies as having a "costly impact for decades to come." 
(Lewis and Sisk, 1993, p. 40) Further, this damage to the 
ecosystem and world stability could affect the U.S. (Lewis and 
Sisk, 1993), and it is in this increasingly alarming context 
that we must determine our answers to the national security 
questions. 
Robert D. Kaplan characterizes the turmoil present in 
some parts of the world as "the coming anarchy." (Kaplan, 
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1994, p. 44) Using West Africa as one example, he has 
depicted the spreading social unrest, deforestation, 
overpopulation, and disease as the seeds for a breakdown of 
the existing concept of nation-states (Kaplan, 1994). This 
scenario outlines a large and elemental conflict with U.S. 
goals of "enlarging" the number of democratic states in the 
world. One can begin to see where a broader definition of 
national security and interest would be appropriate. 
The environmental repercussions of this type of 
instability include mass migration of refugees and conflict 
over water and other resource shortages. At the very least, 
the spillover affects neighboring countries with the potential 
for a more global impact. 
Proponents of broader use of the armed forces look at 
these possible environmental dangers to U.S. security and view 
DOD as a partial solution. They see the technological and 
organizational skills of the military being put to use through 
security assistance programs or other initiatives such as the 
Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (a 
joint Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, 
and DOD project established by Congress in 1990). The Air 
Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Army Chemical 
Corps, various branches of the Army Medical Department, or 
similar units could be put to use for education, assessment, 
clean-up, and restoration of environment-related concerns, 
which could prevent damage that could endanger U.S. national 
security. (Butts, 1994) 
Others who support using the military for non-traditional 
missions point to problems in the U.S. and claim that the 
greatest threats to national well-being are within the 
country's borders. Former Commerce Secretary Peter G. 
Peterson, for example, believes that domestic economic, 
educational, and urban difficulties threaten "America's long- 
term  national  security  more  than  the  traditional 
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preoccupations of security and foreign policy such as the 
menace of Soviet nuclear bombs or conventional attacks on our 
territory or vital interest." (Brehm and Gray, 1992, p. 5) 
John L. Petersen has likened the desired response of the 
U.S. military in the face of this new security scenario to 
that of a successful business reacting to a changing market. 
He feels that the military's strategy should include the 
development of a new vision, adaptation to change, expansion 
of information technology and access, and expansion of the 
product line or roles and missions. Petersen sees the outcome 
as a "dual-use" military able to deal with both external and 
internal threats to U.S. national security. (Petersen, 1993) 
In recognition of the new national and global dangers, 
the President's National Security Strategy has been broadened. 
The current policy, issued in February 1995, addresses the new 
threats in attempting to meet the stated goals of: 
• Sustaining national security with military forces 
ready to fight; 
• Bolstering America's economic revitalization; and 
• Promoting democracy abroad. (U.S. President, 1995, p. 
i) 
Likewise, the 1995 version of the National Military 
Strategy has affirmed "the importance of the growing use of 
U.S. forces in peacekeeping and other non-combat operations." 
(Graham, 1995, p. 36) The document also stated that, in 
addition to combat duties, the military must help "to reduce 
the sources of conflict." (Graham, 1995, p. 36) 
Promotion of democracy has been called "one of the 
cheapest, most cost effective ways of advancing the national 
interest." (Lucy, 1994, p. 10) The Air Force has stated that 
contingency and humanitarian airlift actions "strengthen 
allies, provide humanitarian assistance, and allow the United 
States to influence events important to our national security 
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and the security of the free world (Department of the Air 
Force, 1990, p. 14). 
Another example of the benefits of non-traditional 
missions to national security is the work of the Army Corps of 
Engineers in Saudi Arabia. Here, the Army personnel were 
involved in over $14 billion worth of construction efforts. 
Some view the relationships and trust formed between the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia during the building of these projects as 
instrumental to the manner in which Operations Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm were conducted. It was important that the 
Saudis knew that the Americans would do a good job and leave 
when the job was done; otherwise, Saudi Arabia might not have 
felt comfortable with providing the support that they did. 
(Cropsey and Brinkerhoff, 1993) 
In response to the argument that DOD should not engage in 
any activities that could decrease their primary warfighting 
mission, Patricia Irvin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, has stated: 
. I would say with respect to humanitarian 
emergencies, that great powers should venture 
beyond parochialism when the moment reguires it— 
and we know complex humanitarian emergencies will 
happen again and again. Chaos, the distinguishing 
characteristic of humanitarian emergencies, is not 
in the interest of the United States anywhere: It 
is the ground on which political fanaticism is 
built and tyrants raised, and it is as destructive 
to the economy and infrastructure of a country as a 
full-scale war. I believe thriving economies in 
other countries are in the best interests of the 
United States. (Irvin, 1994, pp. 3-4) 
This point of view can, and should, be extended beyond 
humanitarian assistance to include domestic use of the 
military and other foreign support. One side of the 
aforementioned RAND noncombat missions workshop controversy 
was presented in the previous section. The other side favors 
acceptance of noncombat missions as a vital and increasing 
part of Air Force operations.  These officers felt that the 
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noncombat missions offered training benefits for combat 
preparation. They rejected the claims that the Air Force's 
"combat capability" or "professional fighting spirit" would be 
reduced were non-traditional missions to be conducted (Builder 
and others, 1993, p. 63). 
This group of Air Force officers saw the Air Force as a 
"military servant of the nation" and felt that the service's 
"view of itself and its desirable capabilities should change" 
according to the changing needs of the nation (Builder and 
others, 1993, p. 64) . These thoughts could be summarized with 
a vision of a "properly configured" Air Force that provided 
America with a broad spectrum of abilities, including both 
combat and non-traditional roles, to be used as necessary 
(Builder and others, 1993, p. 63). 
The proponents of non-traditional missions also point out 
the positive benefits to the military itself, in addition to 
the effect on national security. For example, Barnes claims 
that: 
By creating an effective military capability 
to provide civic action, H/CA [humanitarian and 
civic assistance], and disaster relief . . ., the 
U.S. will be better able to protect its security 
interests in peacetime, while insuring the 
readiness of its wartime military capability. 
(Barnes, 1989, p. 40) 
To further develop the idea of multimission services, the 
next section discusses the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard 
has a long history of service, military and otherwise, and an 
approach to non-traditional mission tasking that is somewhat 
different than that of the DOD services. 
D.   THE COAST GUARD:  MODEL FOR DOD? 
The United States Coast Guard is a military organization 
whose history and experiences might serve as an example for 
DOD's future.   While the majority of the Coast Guard's 
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missions are civilian in nature and the service is part of the 
Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard is designated in 
law as a branch of the armed forces of the United States 
(Stubbs, 1992) and has ably served in most of the nation's 
wars. The Coast Guard has the same personnel rank and rating 
structure as the U.S. Navy, and the service shares the same 
pay scale as the DOD services along with many other 
similarities. 
Just as the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have 
a singular mission they hold dearest, so does the Coast Guard. 
As discussed previously, in DOD this primary purpose is 
"combat, to deter and defeat enemies of the United States." 
(Huntington, 1993, p. 43) Although some may go back to the 
Coast Guard's roots and the establishment of the Revenue 
Cutter Service in 1790 to regard law enforcement as their 
primary purpose (Larzelere, 1993), most would disagree. In 
the words of Admiral Robert Kramek, Commandant of the Coast 
Guard: 
The fundamental essence of the Coast Guard is 
our role as lifesavers and guardians of the sea. 
That has been our tradition for 200 years. It is 
the thing that gives our people the most 
gratification—rescuing people who might otherwise 
die. . . . That is the bedrock mission. In my 
view, search and rescue would be the last mission 
ever to leave' the Coast Guard. (Kramek, 1995, p. 
60) 
As has been pointed out, the U.S. military has been 
involved in countless roles and missions other than the one it 
considers primary. The same is also true of the Coast Guard. 
However, a difference emerges when we contrast Coast Guard and 
DOD perceptions of their "other" missions. A widely-held 
opinion in DOD maintains that noncombat-related activities are 
unnecessary distractions to the primary warfighting mission. 
On the other hand, while saving lives may be the primary 
92 
mission of the Coast Guard, the service has always considered 
itself a multi-mission service (Kime, 1993) . 
In addition to embracing the concept of multiple 
missions, the Coast Guard has seen great changes in the nature 
of its missions over the years. Service directives list the 
four primary roles of the Coast Guard as maritime safety 
(including search and rescue), maritime law enforcement, 
marine environmental protection, and national security (Coast 
Guard, 1995) . Specific missions within these broad areas ebb 
and flow with the needs of the presidential administration and 
nation. For instance, in 1957 the Coast Guard had cutters on 
weather station in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, personnel 
manning Loran A navigation stations around the world, and 
wooden patrol boats on harbor entrance patrols examining 
merchant vessels entering U.S. ports (Larzelere, 1993). None 
of these missions now exist. 
Other missions have come to the fore. In the 1980s, the 
Coast Guard became a major player performing drug interdiction 
in the Reagan-Bush War on Drugs. By fiscal 1989, drug 
interdiction efforts accounted for nearly 24 percent of the 
Coast Guard's Operating Expenses (OE) budget (Landry, 1994). 
However, as experience, DOD participation, better 
intelligence, and greater agency coordination combined to 
change drug trafficker's methods and the nature of the Drug 
War (Kaufman, 1993), drug interdiction's share of the OE 
budget decreased to less than ten percent by fiscal 1995. In 
its place, during the same time span, Alien Migrant 
Interdiction Operations (Haitian, Cuban, and Chinese) grew 
from around seven percent of OE to nearly 12 percent, and 
fisheries law enforcement to protect depleted fish stocks 
doubled to 15 percent of the OE budget (Landry, 1994). 
Passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, following the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill disaster, has brought about continuous growth 
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in  Coast  Guard  marine  environmental  protection  duties 
(Hessman, 1993). 
Admiral J. William Kime, Commandant of the Coast Guard 
from 1990 until 1994, made the following statement about 
change: 
The multimissioned flexibility of the Coast 
Guard has served us well in absorbing the impact of 
. . . rapid change, while retaining our trademark 
poise and professionalism in responding to national 
crises on a moment's notice. . . • The Coast Guard 
has always adapted well to change. Throughout its 
history, and into its third century of service, the 
Coast Guard has and will continue to use this 
adaptability to define and redefine itself and its 
mission. Change has kept us in sync with the needs 
of the public we serve. (Kime, 1993, p. 59) 
Admiral Kramek, while Coast Guard Chief of Staff in 1993 
(before his appointment to Commandant), stated: 
What makes us valuable is this great 
flexibility, this multi-mission ability that we 
have, and that is why we are not being reduced, and 
that is why we are being supported. (Kaufman, 1993, 
p. 34) 
The lesson to be learned by DOD is that changing to meet 
the needs of the nation can be desirable and advantageous. 
Change has served to keep the Coast Guard relevant to 
America's needs. However, multi-mission ability can have its 
drawbacks in a world with limited resources. In 1982, the 
National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) 
reported that a Coast Guard "unable ... to fill all of its 
statutory responsibilities" needed a combination of task 
narrowing, resource expansion, and an "altered approach" to 
performing its tasks (U.S. NACOA, 1983, p. 27). 
Although the Coast Guard has been relatively successful 
at protecting its budget in recent years, the added mission 
responsibilities continue to cause problems. When the Coast 
Guard "surges" to respond to a crisis, such as the flood of 
Haitian immigrants in the 1990s with the resultant Operation 
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Able Manner, it "places a serious strain on our [the Coast 
Guard's] ability to respond to other incidents. Maintenance 
of our resources is also strained due to the increased pace of 
operations." (Larzelere, 1994, p. 25) Cutter and aircraft 
operational programming were exceeded by 10 to 15 and 5 
percent, respectively, and dockside and shipyard availability 
(maintenance) periods were delayed (Larzelere, 1994) . Admiral 
Kramek is concerned that "we are going to work them [Coast 
Guard personnel] so hard that they are not going to be happy, 
productive employees any more." (Kramek, 1994, p. 12) 
The Coast Guard is currently conducting a "streamlining" 
study in an effort to reorganize, use, and manage resources 
more efficiently (Coast Guard, 1994) . With steady downward 
pressure on budgets and no sign of reduced mission demand, 
these efforts are perhaps the only available recourse. There 
is another clear lesson here for DOD: if new responsibilities 
are not accompanied by adequate funding, personnel, and 
equipment, then the military faces dangers that could 
compromise its present capabilities. These issues are 
discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
E.   BUDGETARY AND READINESS ISSUES 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm raised 
questions about the Total Forces concept and availability of 
the reserves. Although performance of reserve components in 
support roles was generally rated positively, none of the 
National Guard "round-out" combat units was ever deployed to 
the combat area (Moskos, 1994). However, others feel that 
this last fact may have been due more to Army regulars' 
negative perceptions of the Guard's combat abilities and note 
that Marine Corps combat reserve performance in the Gulf was 
deemed superb (Walker, 1992). 
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Some support the shifting of an even higher percentage of 
the military support and combat support roles to the reserves. 
These observers argue that if the reserves are not going to be 
used for combat, then they should be used primarily for 
support duties. These support duties are well-suited for 
providing assistance in many non-traditional missions, as 
well. The proponents of this strategy go even further in 
saying that this approach should figure into justifications 
for force structure and budget. (Brehm and Gray, 1992) 
Regardless, calls for National Guard roles "other than 
active force backup" such as "maintaining domestic order, 
disaster relief, and youth training" have either been 
"reemphasized" or introduced in recent years (Moskos, 1994, p. 
141) . As previously observed, active-duty and reserve 
component involvement in non-traditional missions has risen 
since the end of the Cold War. However, this greater 
involvement in largely unplanned actions has had an adverse 
effect on the military budget. The ramifications of the 
unfunded costs of these operations can be severe, as Patricia 
Irvin has stated: 
These [humanitarian operations] represent 
large, unbudgeted expenses for the Defense 
Department. Unless a way is developed to pay for 
them, the result could be reductions in training, 
force structure, modernization and quality of life 
for our troops—all of which could translate into 
reduced readiness. Clearly an immediate solution 
to this problem is essential. (Irvin, 1994, p. 3) 
While speaking specifically of humanitarian operations, 
Irvin's statement applies to the broad spectrum of non- 
traditional missions, and the budget problems resulting from 
the present funding mechanism may have a harmful effect on 
readiness. 
For example, in a slide briefing to the Roles and 
Missions Commission on September 14, 1994, the Army stated the 
following: 
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The primary difficulty with operations other 
than war lies in the loss of funds required to 
sustain readiness. For contingency operations so 
far in 1994 alone, there is a $120 million dollar 
shortfall to the Army. Diverting funds from one 
Army program or budget line to pay for these 
operations degrades Army readiness. These resource 
challenges have not been adequately addressed in 
the past. The increased frequency of these 
missions and the Army's ability to carry them out 
dictate a recognition that operations other than 
war must be sufficiently resourced to maintain and 
improve our abilities in this area in the future. 
(Department of the Army, 1994) 
Congress at least partially addressed the immediate 
situation by approving a $3.1 billion supplement in the spring 
of 1995. However, only $51.6 million of this sum was 
earmarked for the reserves who estimate to have spent nearly 
$1.3 billion on unplanned operations in Cuba, Haiti, Iraq, and 
Rwanda. The financial shortfalls resulting from these 
unexpected missions have caused unfunded equipment maintenance 
to rise from $49 million in 1993 to $239 million in 1995. 
(Matthews, 1995) 
With the current U.S. policies of engagement and 
enlargement, it appears that the U.S. will continue to become 
involved in unplanned contingency operations to achieve 
national goals. Bearing this in mind, one must compare the 
cost of unilateral action to that of U.N. or coalition 
operations. If the U.S. chooses to participate in U.N.-led 
operations, the price tag is much lower (U.S. President, 
1995). For example, the U.S. paid 85 percent of Operation 
Restore Hope in Somalia, but pays roughly 31 percent of a 
U.N.-led mission (Linn, 1993). 
Additionally, U.N. forces have replaced U.S. troops in 
operations in Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. This has 
allowed American military personnel to return to the U.S. 
safely and resume planned activities. (U.S. President, 1995) 
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It should also be noted that the relative costs of most 
non-traditional mission areas are quite small when compared 
with the whole defense budget. For example, the total cost to 
the U.S. of U.N. peacekeeping efforts in fiscal 1994 was less 
than one-half of one percent of DOD's budget (U.S. President, 
1995). 
However, Samuel Huntington sees another budgetary danger 
stemming from increased acceptance of non-traditional 
missions. Huntington fears that, while all acknowledge that 
the defense budget is declining, the share of purely military 
funding will decrease faster than funding for non-traditional 
missions, which may be more popular and politically 
acceptable. The result could be inadequate combat forces. 
(Huntington, 1993) 
In other words, even though operations such as 
peacekeeping may account for only a fraction of the total 
defense budget, the sum of all non-traditional mission costs 
may become significant, particularly when expenditures for 
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) environmental clean-up and 
other related actions, non-defense items in the DOD budget, 
defense manufacturer conversion funding, and the like are also 
competing for a piece of the military dollar (Congressional 
Budget Office, 1995). Policy makers will need to look across 
the entire spectrum of demands upon the military when deciding 
what missions to perform. 
Another issue with readiness and budgetary ramifications 
is training for non-traditional missions. Some believe that 
"general purpose" units will be able to handle most of these 
missions, while others feel that specialized training or even 
dedicated units may be necessary to conduct these actions 
(Rosenau, 1994). The decision could be expensive in more ways 
than one. 
An avenue suggested by some is a limitation on the type 
of non-traditional mission support provided.  By restricting 
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U.S. involvement to training, logistics, lift 
(transportation), and command, control, communications, and 
intelligence, the U.S. could reduce the impact on readiness 
and the budget. (Ullman, 1995) 
A more expansive approach involves more efficient use of 
American forces. U.S. Navy Admiral Paul David Miller is an 
advocate of using the military as both a "sword and a 
plowshare." (Miller, 1993, p. 14) To allow leaders to 
appropriately tailor the selection of forces for each mission, 
he advises a capability-based military force structure instead 
of the Cold War-style, threat-based military (Miller, 1993). 
The recent development and use of the Adaptive Joint Force 
Package concept is an example of the military getting "the 
most from investments already made" rather than doing "more 
with less." (Miller, 1994, p. 12) 
A panel of the 1992 National Defense University symposium 
on non-traditional missions made the following 
recommendations: 
• Rebalance military missions and priorities. Do not 
assume that the capabilities required for non- 
traditional roles are any less than those required for 
traditional missions; 
• Conduct long-term planning for non-traditional 
missions; and 
• Ensure greater interagency coordination occurs. 
(Graham, 1993, p. 124) 
The clear lesson here is that non-traditional missions 
should not be performed "out of hide." Aside from the 
relative merits of conducting these "other" missions, the 
impact on military readiness and budgets cannot be overstated. 
If the American military is to engage in more non-traditional 
missions, the nation's civilian leadership must provide the 
necessary funding, personnel, and equipment for both the 
traditional and non-traditional missions. 
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Several recent studies have concluded that overall 
military readiness has not yet suffered, but there is a 
definite potential for future degradation (Congressional 
Budget Office, 1995). Secretary of Defense William Perry, for 
example, has expressed concern that military readiness and 
morale might shrink over time (Austen, 1994). A positive sign 
was the December 1994 announcement by President Clinton that 
he plans to pursue a total of $25 billion more in the defense 
budget spread over the period fiscal 1996 to fiscal 2001 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1995). Congressional interest 
in the ongoing debate over non-traditional missions is 
considered in the next section. 
F.   THE ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE 
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act, which is known primarily for placing 
requirements on DOD for more "jointness" between the services, 
was passed by Congress in 1986. This legislation also 
stipulated that, at least every three years, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) review the roles and functions 
of the military and issue a report with recommended changes. 
This requirement was aimed at increasing the effectiveness of 
the armed forces. (GAO 1993, GAO/NSIAD-93-200) 
The first report was issued in 1989 and is not 
particularly germane to the subject of this paper. The 1993 
report was submitted by General Colin Powell. In the report, 
the terms "roles," "missions," and "functions" were defined as 
follows to show the distinction between them. 
• Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which 
the services were established by Congress in law; 
• Missions are the tasks assigned to the combatant 
Commanders in Chief (CINCs) by the President or 
Secretary of Defense; and 
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• Functions are specific responsibilities assigned by 
the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the 
services to execute their roles. (Department of 
Defense, 1993, p. iv) 
The report went on to show the interrelationship of the terms 
with the statement "the primary function of the Services is to 
provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a 
role—to be employed by a CINC in the accomplishment of a 
mission." (Department of Defense, 1993, p. iv.) 
The report deals mainly with attempts to eliminate 
unnecessary duplication and redundancy between the services. 
While these topics are somewhat outside the primary scope of 
this paper, the report did touch somewhat upon non-traditional 
missions. Counter-drug operations were acknowledged as an 
expanded mission area for DOD. Additionally, a new CINC for 
American forces stationed in the continental U.S. was 
established with planned responsibilities to include providing 
assistance to domestic authorities after disasters and 
supporting U.N. peacekeeping efforts. (Department of Defense, 
1993) 
Members of Congress generally felt that the report did 
not go far enough in suggesting recommendations in light of 
the changes in national security needs and the decline in 
defense spending brought about by the end of the Cold War 
(U.S. Congress, House 1993). A 1993 GAO study concluded that 
the 1993 report was an improvement over the 1989 report and 
did make some important recommendations. GAO also concurred 
with the prevailing opinion in Congress that the report had 
not gone into enough depth. Among the GAO comments was a 
finding that the report did not examine the new important 
missions of the post-Cold War era in enough detail. (GAO 1993, 
GAO/NSIAD-93-200) 
In May 1994, as a result of its continued dissatisfaction 
with the 1993 report, Congress directed that DOD establish a 
commission to examine U.S. military roles and missions.  The 
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Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces was 
formed in response to this directive (Federal Register, 1994). 
The commission also became known as the "White Commission," 
after its chairman, John White. 
The mandate of the White Commission was to: 
• Review the appropriateness of existing service role, 
mission, and function allocations for the post-Cold 
War era; 
• Evaluate and report on alternative distribution of 
these allocations among the services; and 
• Recommend changes to the existing definitions and 
allocation of military roles, missions, and functions. 
(Federal Register, 1994) 
The overriding purpose of the Commission on Roles and 
Missions was seen as eliminating redundancy and streamlining 
force structure to allow the most effective future military 
possible. However, some members of Congress were known to 
view the procedure as a means to reduce the defense budget and 
provide an additional "peace dividend." (Yost, 1994) 
Proponents of the military services were alarmed by this 
possibility. For example, the president of the Navy League of 
the United States, during an invited session with the 
commission, specifically and strongly addressed dangers he and 
his organization perceived in cutting military spending purely 
as a budgetary tool (Baker, 1994). 
In preparation for release of the commission's report, 
armed forces planning personnel were developing papers 
defending the need for roles and missions seen as likely to be 
cut (Yost, 1994). Interservice rivalries also resulted in 
calls from the services to retain their respective missions 
and assets at the expense of another service's resources 
(Hölzer, 1995) . 
Preliminary information from the commission indicated 
that, in addition to the major missions of the services, they 
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were also looking at who was performing non-traditional 
missions. John White had remarked that the nation should not 
"automatically turn to the military" and that other government 
agencies should have the wherewithal to respond to 
emergencies. (Matthews, 1994, p. 11) 
Commentary about a draft of the commission's report to 
Congress surfaced in late April of 1995. These assessments 
indicated that the "services emerge relatively unscathed from 
the roles and missions debate." (Glashow and Hölzer, 1995, p. 
1) A Marine source stated that there was "nothing very 
substantial" in the draft report, and an Air Force Major 
General felt that "the commission has been unable, for a 
variety of reasons, to address the interservice disagreement 
about warfighting doctrine." (Glashow and Hölzer, 1995, p. 1) 
Bob Gaskin of Business Executives for National Security, a 
group that advocates a leaner military, said "The commission 
ducked the hard issues. Political pressure prevailed. They 
plowed no new ground." (Pexton, 1995, p. 8) 
Some of the draft report recommendations include 
privatization of portions of the defense support function, 
further "jointness" among the services (Pexton, 1995), and 
fuller integration of the reserves with their active-duty 
counterparts (Glashow and Hölzer, 1995). Additionally, the 
commission is said to have concluded "that, like it or not, 
the military must expect and be prepared for more peacekeeping 
and other operations short of war in the next 20 years." 
(Pexton, 1995, p. 8) 
It appeared from these comments that the commission would 
advocate "greater focus on adjusting each service's core 
mission to include studying how each can contribute more to 
overseas presence and peacekeeping operations." (Glashow and 
Hölzer, 1995, p. 14) The commission was also expected to 
suggest improved integration and coordination of all agencies 
involved in national security with the thought that some 
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missions such as immigration control might be better handled 
by the State or Justice departments instead of the military. 
(Pexton, 1995). 
The commission's final report was submitted to Congress 
on May 24, 1995. As expected, the commission chose a 
different tack for their report. Stating that the guestion 
was no longer "who does what," but how are the necessary 
capabilities provided for joint commanders, the report 
concentrated on three areas: effective unified military 
operations, efficient and responsive support, and improved 
management and direction. (Department of Defense, 1995) 
With respect to non-traditional missions, the commission 
concluded that "the U.S. Military will be called on to perform 
a broader array of missions in more diverse contingency 
situations than they did in the past while still maintaining 
a capability for large-scale regional conflicts." (Department 
of Defense, 1995, p. vii) Another statement from the report 
along these lines was that DOD "faces an unclear future marked 
by rapid change, diverse contingencies, limited budgets, and 
a broad range of missions to support evolving national 
security policies." (Department of Defense, 1995, p. 1-1) 
The commission saw the following missions as emerging and 
growing in importance: combatting proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, information warfare, peace operations, and 
operations other than war (OOTW). These missions are areas 
where "DOD must expand capabilities but without sacrificing 
its ability to fight the Nation's wars." (Department of 
Defense, 1995, p. ES-4) 
The potential importance of peace operations in 
preventing situations from reaching the stage where American 
forces would be needed for combat was the grounds for 
separating peace operations from the rest of the OOTW 
category. The commission felt that peace operations should be 
given a higher priority than currently assigned, and that 
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specific training and equipment were appropriate. Integration 
of resources with, and use of, other agencies and adequate 
funding so as to not interfere with readiness were also 
stressed. (Department of Defense, 1995) 
Operations other than war were recognized as "appropriate 
in circumstances where speed is essential or other 
capabilities are not available." (Department of Defense, 1995, 
p. 2-17) While the commission recommended that DOD should 
assign proper priorities to OOTW and integrate OOTW 
capabilities into overall planning, limited use of military 
forces in favor of civilian agency response was preferable. 
(Department of Defense, 1995) 
Another White Commission recommendation called for an 
increase in planning and preparation for coalition operations, 
and additional funding for the Military-to-Military Contact 
and International Military Education and Training programs. 
(Department of Defense, 1995) 
The report also recommended that reserve components be 
sized and shaped more in line with national strategy needs, 
integrated more with the active duty components, and receive 
better training and evaluation. Reserve forces in excess of 
needs were recommended for elimination. (Department of 
Defense, 1995) 
The final ramifications of the White Commission's 
recommendations remain to be seen. Congress must still review 
and act (or refrain from acting) upon the roles and missions 
issues. However, the report of the Commission on Roles and 
Missions of the Armed Forces may have a long-term bearing on 
the mission focus, both traditional and non-traditional, of 
America's armed forces as well as the manner in which support 
functions and planning are conducted. 
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G.   SIGNS OF CHANGE 
As far back as 1991, military leaders praised the 
positive benefits of increasing non-traditional missions. In 
his 1991 report to Congress, then Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney stated that the "humanitarian and civic assistance 
programs of the Department of Defense have significantly 
advanced U.S. national security objectives, . . . assisted 
people in need in over 4 0 nations and strengthened our 
security relationships with friendly governments." (Morrison, 
1991, p. 1260) . The Joint Chiefs of Staff were guoted in 
their 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment report as noting that 
nation-building and similar activities "extend our political 
good will and access to foreign markets." (Morrison, 1991, p. 
1260) Also, then Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice 
said that "humanitarian operations in response to disasters 
. play a role in supporting U.S. national security 
objectives by providing foreign populations with a favorable 
image of the United States." (Morrison, 1991, p. 1260) 
In their January 1993 report for fiscal 1992, the Reserve 
Forces Policy Board made the following statement: 
Roles that received less emphasis during the 
Cold War are now becoming more important. These 
roles include an expanded civil affairs capability, 
drug interdiction or eradication, drug demand 
reduction, youth education and training programs, 
environmental education, and nation building. Each 
Reserve component has capabilities which can be 
effectively used within these mission areas. Using 
the Reserve components for these types of missions 
can also be an effective national policy. (Reserve 
Forces Policy Board, 1993, p. xvi) 
This board went further to recommend that the domestic 
missions mentioned be "formally" assigned to the Reserve 
components along with increased involvement in the other areas 
(Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1993). 
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In the 1993 Report of the Secretary of Defense to the 
President and the Congress, DOD "policies and activities" were 
said to "have been adjusted to cope with the security 
requirements of the post-Cold War world (Department of 
Defense, 1993, p. 22). The individual sections dedicated to 
each of the services also spoke, in part, of conducting non- 
traditional missions in response to the changing world 
(Department of Defense, 1993). 
As mentioned previously, the current versions of both the 
National Security Strategy (U.S. President, 1995) and the 
National Military Strategy (U.S. Department of Defense, 1995) 
address the importance of non-traditional missions in 
furthering the goals of the nation. In addition to policy 
changes, it appears the U.S. has learned from recent past 
mistakes during non-traditional missions as well. 
Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, has stated that there 
are two criteria for determining whether or not to use the 
armed services in a humanitarian emergency. First, the 
situation must have a "clear purpose" for military involvement 
and an "achievable objective." (Holmes 1995, p. 30) Second, 
the situation must be severe enough so that the normal relief 
agencies cannot handle it and thus there is an "urgent" need 
for military forces. If these conditions are satisfied, DOD 
resources would be utilized with the intent to replace them 
with other relief agencies whenever feasible (Holmes, 1995). 
These thoughts echo earlier statements by the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, 
Patricia Irvin (Irvin, 1994). 
In April 1995, Defense Secretary William J. Perry spoke 
of the need for wisdom in determining appropriate responses in 
the post-Cold War world. Perry stated that the decision- 
making process for use of the military had political, 
military, and ethical elements, and that the armed forces 
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should not be the tool of choice for every humanitarian 
crisis. The Defense Secretary used the large-scale, short- 
notice, yet limited, military airlift for Rwanda as an example 
in stipulating the following four criteria for involvement of 
U.S. forces: 
• Situation involves a natural or manmade catastrophe 
that dwarfs the response capabilities of normal relief 
agencies; 
• Urgent need for relief that only the military has the 
ability to initiate; 
• The relief response requires resources only the 
military has; and 
• There is minimal risk to the lives of U.S. military 
personnel. (Perry, 1995, p. 37) 
Secretary Perry used similar logic in explaining the 
decision to refrain from becoming part of the current U.N. 
peace operations in Bosnia. His.position was that the price 
of achieving peace in the region would necessitate far too 
many casualties and too high a cost for the benefit to 
American national interest (Summers, 1995). He went on to 
say: 
Our use of force . . . will be selective and 
limited, reflecting the relative importance of the 
outcome to our interest. We have a whole range of 
options. They go from using U.S. military assets 
for logistical operations to using U.S. combat 
forces. The decision of what to use . . . will 
reflect the cost we are willing to pay to achieve 
the outcome we want. . . . Our interests should 
dictate where we get involved and the extent of 
military involvement. (Summers, 1995, p. 15) 
The lesson of experience, primarily from the difficulties in 
Somalia, appears to be the recognition of limits. The U.S. 
has hopefully learned the value of considering the "big 
picture" before setting out on a course of action. 
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A recent statement from the current Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, indicates a 
recognition of the balance that must be reached between 
obvious needs and resource limitations. General Shalikashvili 
stated: 
. . . there are some in the Pentagon who'd be very 
happy if I put outside a sign that read, "We only 
do the big ones." The notion that we exist, first 
and foremost, to fight our nation's wars is 
something I subscribe to. But I also say, "In this 
new world, we cannot deny our Government a very 
important tool to try to manage crises, bring 
stability to an area, deal with operations that 
overwhelm traditional humanitarian organizations." 
But you have to be selective—or you could fritter 
away resources and capabilities. (Dreifus, 1995, p. 
37) 
This chapter has portrayed the current issues surrounding 
non-traditional missions and, particularly evident in the 
growth and learning documented in this last section, the 
viewpoints of today's political and military administrations. 
The next, and final, chapter consolidates and summarizes the 
various aspects of the non-traditional mission debate. 
Lessons "learned" from the research and analysis are presented 
along with final thoughts on the future of non-traditional 
missions in the U.S. military. 
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VI.  OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.   SUMMARY 
This paper has presented the evidence of past and present 
U.S. military involvement in non-traditional missions. An 
examination of current issues has also been included with the 
premise that the overall thesis "package" would serve as a 
means for an educated discussion of the future of these 
"other" missions.  Still, some might ask, why the military? 
One answer to the question can be found in a recent RAND 
report: 
• The military is uniquely trained and equipped for 
hazardous duty; 
• The military can often provide a political and/or 
strategic benefit when used in "nontraditional" 
missions; and 
• The military can bring a broad scope of capabilities 
and organizational structures into areas and 
situations where ordinary civil institutions may no 
longer be functioning. (Lempert and others, 1993, p. 
vi) 
In other words, the military is used because they can be 
counted on to complete large scale, difficult jobs that other 
organizations would be unable to do in an adequate or timely 
manner. 
Furthermore, James Fallows has noted the long-time use of 
the U.S. military for advancing "the notion of the common 
good:" 
The military, strangely, is the one government 
institution that has been assigned the legitimacy 
to act on its notion of the collective good. 
'National Defense' can make us do things—train 
engineers, build highways—that the long-term good 
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of the nation or common sense cannot.  (Fallows, 
1991, p. 20) 
However, other, more contentious questions revolve around 
the issue of the proper role of America's military. As 
alluded to earlier, one school of thought has emerged which 
portrays increases in the performance of non-traditional 
missions as movement down a long dark road ending in disaster 
for the military and the nation. An eloquent example of this 
argument is Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.'s "The Origins of the 
American Military Coup of 2012." This fictional essay is a 
cautionary tale where the military becomes heavily involved in 
non-traditional missions. In the end, the primacy of civilian 
control of the military dissolves, and the armed forces take 
over control of the nation (Dunlap, 1992). Dunlap's article 
has even been used to defend positions in other papers 
advocating a strict focus on warfighting duties only 
(Baranzini, 1993). 
Dunlap's essay, along with a later effort entitled "The 
Last American Warrior: Non-Traditional Missions and the 
Decline of the U.S. Armed Forces," (Dunlap, 1994) call 
attention to the possible dangers implicit in a policy that 
ignores military readiness and combat preparation. The 
articles are based on the premise that America will conduct 
non-traditional missions to the exclusion of training for 
combat purposes. Although interesting reading, a more 
balanced account of the issues and concerns is more useful to 
our discussion than one-sided position pieces. 
It is not reasonable to assume, as Dunlap has speculated, 
that the U.S. will blindly turn its back on armed forces' 
combat missions as it charges off to make the country and 
world a better place. Current activities and plans for the 
future must reach an equilibrium between force size and 
structure, funding, operational tempo, service to the world 
and nation, and warfighting readiness. The military services 
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and civil authorities, such as the Executive branch and 
Congress, both have too much power and too great a stake in 
the outcome to expect a large change favoring either 
traditional or non-traditional missions at the expense of the 
other. The recent development of criteria for involvement and 
restraint in Rwanda and Bosnia are sure signs of this balance 
of power in action. 
The overwhelming fact must be realized that concepts of 
potential global dangers and national security have changed. 
And America must evolve with them. One panel of the 1992 
National Defense University symposium concluded that: 
the national security community must 
recognize the usefulness of non-traditional 
missions. The task of the military is to provide 
for the common defense. In today's world all the 
instruments of military power must be utilized, to 
include those of a non-traditional nature. (Graham, 
1993, p. 124) 
One strategy analyst has taken this idea of utility even 
further to look at the relationship among the military, 
national productivity, and the economy. Colonel David Shaver 
has talked about a "balanced strategy" where the military is 
"able to respond to a wide array of policy options" while, at 
the same time, being utilized "in peacetime for purposes which 
increase American productivity." (Shaver, 1990, p. 25) He has 
also developed a model for integrating the U.S. economic and 
military might to improve the country's competitiveness 
(Shaver, 1990). 
Other analysts have addressed issues related to the 
downsizing of the U.S. military. On the matter of balancing 
missions with decreased military size and budget, Bernard 
Trainor, retired Marine Corps General and current director of 
the National Security Program at Harvard University's John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, has stated: 
They [supporters of a drastically decreased 
military force size] are of a belief that we can 
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have a far smaller military force because the 
dangers are less, and we can afford to be involved 
in these [humanitarian] interventions. But there 
is a very interesting corollary to this which you 
might want to think about. If you accept the fact 
that the United States is not going to be involved 
in these . . . efforts, you can have a small but 
very high-tech military trained for combat and 
combat alone. On the other hand—and this is where 
these people get caught—extensive humanitarian 
efforts are not technology-intensive. They are 
manpower intensive, and manpower always costs more 
than technology. If that is what you want, if you 
have forsaken the possibility of violent war or 
said it is unlikely and the major post-cold-war 
mission of the U.S. military is going to be in 
humanitarian-type operations, that means you are 
going to have a large military because humanitarian 
intervention requires manpower more than 
technology. And if it is manpower-intensive, it is 
going to be expensive. (Trainer, 1995, p. 14) 
These thoughts bring back the example of the U.S. Coast 
Guard. A Coast Guard commander recently compared DOD and the 
Coast Guard with the comment "faced with increasing pressure 
to downsize, other service branches fear becoming a hollow 
force. The Coast Guard fears being perceived as all things to 
all people." (Landry, 1994, p. 73) If DOD continues to become 
more involved in non-traditional missions, it too could come 
to be seen as the solution to too many of the nation's 
problems. 
One key is the use of coalitions and multilateral action 
to alleviate this situation somewhat. At least in the 
international arena, the U.S. should continue to build and use 
its alliances.  As John Galvin has stated: 
The military must be ready for both 
traditional and non-traditional roles. To 
guarantee national security and foster a peaceful 
and prosperous world in which to conduct trade and 
commerce, these roles can be expected to play a 
large part in collective action. This does not 
abrogate U.S. leadership through collective action. 
In fact, it strengthens the binding that the United 
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States has with other nations. (Galvin, 1993, p. 
118) 
Even though America will benefit from the burden- and 
cost-sharing of collective action, the nation's political 
leadership needs to examine the broader picture. Increasing 
the capabilities and use of other U.S. agencies may be 
appropriate in some areas. As a further precaution, the 
concept of real-world limitations must always be considered. 
In the words of Frank Wisner, while serving as Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy in 1993: 
We need also to recognize that not every 
problem has a solution. We do not have the 
resources or the desire to intervene in every 
situation in which groups are fighting or in which 
people are suffering. We will have to make hard 
choices about our interests and capabilities. 
There is an emerging consensus that, in each 
case, we will have to ask some tough questions 
about the nature of a threat .... There is 
unlikely ever to be a strict formula for obtaining 
the right answers .... (Wisner, 1993, p. 1) 
It is imperative that guidelines incorporating these "tough 
questions" be used before a decision to commit U.S. military 
resources is made. 
One area that must be addressed is the role of the 
reserve component. Wallace Earl Walker, Army Colonel and a 
professor of public policy at West Point, has stated that 
reserve forces are the "linchpin of the armed forces" because 
of their presence in local communities and ability to foster 
support for the military in general and its manpower and 
resources (Walker, 1992, p. 315). Walker also states that the 
reserves will "provide the combat support and combat-service 
support needed for the fast-breaking low- and mid-intensity 
conflicts that will dominate future contingencies" and that 
both combat and support reserves will be the "mainstay of U.S. 
preparation for general war scenarios." (Walker, 1992, p. 315) 
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In the downsized military of today, the reserves are more 
involved in almost all types of operations. Additionally, 
many of the suggestions for non-traditional missions call for 
action by support and combat support specialties located in 
the reserve components (Brehm and Gray, 1992). Better 
availability of reserve forces could alleviate increased 
operational tempos found in some active duty units (Terry, 
1994). However, as previously noted, there are restrictions 
on the use of reserves in certain instances (GAO 1993, NSIAD- 
93-180), and some reserve units are already tasked at high 
levels (Terry, 1994). The Air Force Chief of Staff, General 
Ronald R. Fogleman, sees the "goal" as finding "smarter ways 
to use our [military] people and assets" to allow "everybody 
to share the workload." (Fogleman, 1995, p. 5) 
Any increase in the use of reserves must also consider 
the adverse effects on civilian employers and their employees 
in the reserve components (Terry, 1994). Difficulties arising 
from possible dilemmas in this area could hold consequences 
for recruiting and retention. Although a resolution of the 
reserve issue is a necessity, a compromise to please both the 
military and civilian sectors calls for sensible limitations 
on levels of reserve activation. 
Finally, it is proper that the military arrive at its own 
consensus about non-traditional roles and missions. A unified 
armed forces would be better positioned to formulate, voice, 
and defend their stand on the issue. As the authors of a 
recent RAND report dealing with non-traditional missions 
concluded, "if the services do not resolve the issue for 
themselves, it seems likely that it will be resolved for them 
by budgets and mandates imposed from without." (Builder and 
others 1993, p. 64) The recent report of the Commission on 
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces could be a precursor to 
this type of edict. 
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B.   LESSONS LEARNED 
As a result of the research and analysis undertaken for 
the paper, the following "lessons" are offered as a basis for 
continued involvement of the U.S. military in non-traditional 
missions: 
• Non-traditional missions are a traditional use of the 
U.S. military, and have been throughout the history of 
the nation; 
• America's armed forces exist to provide for the 
nation's security, and to defend the people's 
conception of national interests; 
• The truly global nature of today's world has broadened 
the concept of national security and defense to 
include economic and environmental dangers in addition 
to purely military threats; 
• The U.S. military must change along with the changing 
needs of the nation; 
• The capabilities and resources of the armed forces can 
benefit the nation at home and abroad through active 
support of the policy of engagement; 
• It is appropriate to use the U.S. military for a 
myriad of non-traditional missions in the defense of 
broadened national security interests; 
• Non-traditional missions should not be performed at 
the expense of armed forces' combat effectiveness; 
• The military must be properly funded, sized, and 
equipped with the ability to perform both traditional 
and non-traditional missions; 
• Budgets must provide funding "up front" so that 
contingencies are not paid for at the expense of 
planned operations and maintenance; 
• Operational tempo must be controlled to balance the 
need for non-traditional missions with the 
requirements for readiness, so that sufficient 




Regulations and planning for use of reserve forces 
must be revamped for more effective availability of 
reserves to perform support functions; 
Military leadership must instill a sense or 
understanding of the importance of non-traditional 
missions into personnel, addressing education, 
doctrine, and attitude; 
Leaders need to consider use of other agencies or 
coalitions in addition to the armed forces when 
responding to situations; and 
Political and military leadership must recognize 
resource limitations and be selective in choices for 
engagement. 
C.   FINAL THOUGHTS 
There is little doubt or contention that DOD is in the 
midst of a change in mission focus that began, for all intents 
and purposes, in 1989. It is the conclusion here that the new 
focus should concentrate on the so called "non-traditional" 
missions along with the policy of engagement. As has been 
illustrated, a very strong case can be made that these 
missions have been an important, and sometimes dominant, part 
of the military's past service to America. Non-traditional 
missions can be an important part of the present and future 
service of the military as well. 
The military exists to defend the nation. While some 
narrow this definition to strictly a combat role, a broader 
scope would undoubtedly better serve the interests of America 
and its people. There is no mistaking that the military must 
be prepared for combat. However, the armed forces must also 
respond to the needs of the country. Currently, these needs 
mean involvement in the non-traditional missions such as 
disaster response, humanitarian aid, civic and social action, 
peace operations, and the like. The military, along with 
other government agencies, must play its part in America's 
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efforts for greater peace and stability through engagement. 
That said, the nation must be prepared to pay the costs of 
such efforts. The military can, and will, perform these "new" 
missions in an admirable manner, but "robbing Peter to pay 
Paul" must be avoided at all costs. DOD must be properly 
funded and sized for both traditional and non-traditional 
missions, and proper oversight must prevent mission overload. 
The following quotation summarizes the situation in which 
the U.S. military finds itself today. 
The American military is poised at a 
crossroads, looking ahead but still unsure about 
where it wants to go or how to get there. The only 
constants are that all roads have their share of 
punishing curves, and all lead to change. Change 
has never come easily for the military, which is 
firmly rooted in the past. But it must change, and 
it will change in a relatively rapid and radical 
way. (Eitelberg and Mehay 1994, p. 233) 
Perhaps this change will occur through the American military's 
rediscovery of its roots in non-traditional missions as it 
pursues the nation's policy of engagement. 
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APPENDIX B.  AIR FORCE SUPPORT OF NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS, 
1973-1989 
Year  Description of Mission 
1973 Flood relief to Pakistan 
1974 Earthquake relief to Guatemala 
1975 Earthquake relief to Turkey 
Flood relief to Romania 
1976 Transport of rescue teams/equipment to Kentucky mine disaster 
1977 Snow removal relief to Buffalo, New York 
1978 Support in recovery of bodies from Jonestown cult mass suicides 
Evacuation of American citizens from Iran 
1979 Support to Nuclear Regulatory Agency for Three-Mile Island 
1980 Earthquake relief to Terceira Island, Algeria, and Italy 
Cuban refugees to processing centers throughout the U.S. 
1982 Delivery of foodstuffs to famine-stricken areas of Chad 
Earthquake relief to Yeman Arab Republic 
1983 Humanitarian assistance to El Salvador 
Earthquake relief to Turkey 
1984 Medical equipment and supplies to Zaire for AIDS research 
Relief assistance to Ethiopian refugees in Sudan 
1985 Famine relief to Niger, Mali, and Ethiopia 
Earthquake relief to Mexico City 
1986 Typhoon relief to Solomon Islands 
Earthquake relief to El Salvador 
1987 Earthquake relief to Ecuador 
Excess DOD property to Chad and Thailand 
1988 Flood relief to Bangladesh after 30 million left homeless 
Earthquake relief to Armenia   
Source:  Adapted from Military Airlift Command Office of History, 
Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: An Illustrated History of the 
Military Airlift Command. 1941-1991, 1991. 
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APPENDIX C.  CURRENT CIVIL MILITARY-PROGRAMS 
This appendix contains more detailed information on the 
range of Civil-Military programs overseen by the Directorate 
of Civil-Military Programs in the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The information is 
divided into the two categories of programs: education and 
job training, and military training and volunteerism. All 
information in this appendix was obtained from a draft working 
paper of the Directorate of Civil-Military Programs entitled 
Civil-Military Programs: Contributing to Rebuilding America 
and to Military Readiness. 
Job Training and Education Programs: 
ChalleNGe - ChalleNGe is run by the National Guard and 
involves a 22-week residential program followed by a year long 
post-residential mentoring program. It is targeted at 16 to 
18 year old high school dropouts who are drug-free and not in 
serious trouble with the law. Program attributes include GED 
or high school diploma completion, involvement with community 
projects, and citizenship, health, hygiene, skills, 
leadership, and physical training. The program started in ten 
states in June 1993 (Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Oklahoma, and West 
Virginia) and expanded to another six states in 1994 (Alaska, 
Hawaii, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, and 
Virginia). A total of $56 million was budgeted for ChalleNGe 
in fiscal 1994. 
Starbase - Starbase is a National Guard program that had a 
budget of $4 million in fiscal 1994. It is a nonresidential 
program for kindergarten through twelfth grade students and 
their teachers. The program looks to expose classes, 
primarily those of inner-city schools, to "real world" math 
and science applications. Starbase began in June 1993 in 
seven states (California, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, North 
Carolina, Oregon, and Vermont) and was expanded to another 
five states in 1994 (Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Oklahoma, and 
South Dakota). 
Two other offshoots of Starbase are Starbase Atlantis and 
Starbase Kelly. Starbase Atlantis is a combined National 
Guard, Navy, and Naval Reserve effort located in Pensacola, 
Florida.  It is based on the original Starbase program and is 
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conducted for elementary through high school. The budget for 
Starbase Atlantis for fiscal 1994 was $340 thousand. Starbase 
Kelly began on January 30th, 1995 in San Antonio, Texas. It 
is run by the Air Force Reserve and has a $340 thousand budget 
for fiscal 1995. 
Youth Conservation Corps & Urban Youth Corps - The Youth 
Conservation Corps is run by the National Guard and is a six- 
week residential version of the ChalleNGe program without the 
goal of GED completion. It is held at National and is aimed 
at providing learning through service. The Urban Youth Corps 
is also run by the National Guard. It is a six-week non- 
residential version of ChalleNGe held in inner-city armories 
and also excludes the GED goal. These programs began in 1994 
in California, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin under 
Congressional authorization. Roughly $5 million was budgeted 
for these programs in fiscal 1994. 
Seaborne Conservation Corps - The Seaborne Conservation Corps 
(SCC) is a program similar to ChalleNGe that combines the 
efforts of the Navy, Marine Corps, National Guard, Texas A&M 
University at Galveston, and Americorps (from President 
Clinton's National Service program). The SCC operates from a 
ship docked in Galveston and its aim is job training and 
placement in the maritime field along with environmental 
service projects in the Galveston Bay/Houston area. One 
hundred youths are run through SCC each cycle and the fiscal 
1994 budget included $1.5 million from Civil-Military programs 
along with $1.25 million each from the Texas National Guard 
and Americorps. This funding provides for operating and 
maintenance costs, living expenses, and educational awards. 
Additionally, Texas A&M University allowed SCC participants to 
use their recreation facilities. Future plans for SCC include 
shifting the cost for the program to private industry and 
state or local government. 
Civil Air Patrol Falcon Flight Program - This program involves 
sixth grade students. It runs from January to May and 
prepares the students for induction into Civil Air Patrol 
(CAP) squadrons. It is aimed at recruiting "at risk" young 
people and inspiring them to become leaders and good citizens 
through their interest in aerospace. The program attempts to 
ensure the success of the participants at the CAP summer camp 
along with acceptance into the CAP Cadet Program. $42,906 is 
budgeted for the Falcon Flight Program. 
Community and Service Leadership Camp - The Community and 
Service Leadership Camp (CSLC) is a proposal incorporating the 
Army Reserve, Cities in Schools Inc., and the Junior Reserve 
Officer Training Corps Career Academies. Two hundred young 
people from forty cities across the country will be selected 
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to attend a summer camp focusing on citizenship, leadership, 
personal confidence, and community service. The aim of the 
program will be for the participants to design and complete 
supervised community service projects in their hometowns. The 
CSLC has a budget of $350,000, will be held in Scotland, 
Pennsylvania, and is tentatively scheduled for mid-July 
through mid-August of 1995. 
National Civilian Community Corps - The National Civilian 
Community Corps (NCCC) is a demonstration National Service 
Program aimed at giving 18-24 year olds the opportunity to 
help meet domestic needs of the country. One thousand 
participants will receive living expenses and either an 
educational credit worth up to $4,725 or a post-service cash 
benefit of half the amount in exchange for a year of public 
and community service in areas of educational, environmental, 
health and human needs, or public safety concern. Congress 
directed DOD to help get the program started. The thousand 
participants will be housed and trained on four military 
bases. Additionally, military members forced to leave the 
service due to downsizing have the opportunity to serve on the 
permanent staff of the NCCC and provide training and 
leadership to NCCC members. Retired military personnel are 
also able to qualify for more retirement credit through 
participation in the NCCC program. 
JROTC Career Academies - The JROTC Academies are a joint 
DOD/Department of Education program looking to provide inner- 
city high school students with a special academic, vocational, 
and JROTC-intensive program. They are a "school within a 
school" with approximately 200 students. The students attend 
classes together and benefit from a designated staff, reduced 
class size, an advisory board, local business support, and 
sponsorship. The program seeks to combine high school 
graduation with job and social skills development. 
The JROTC Academies are five-year programs initially 
supported by Defense Conversion and Reinvestment funds with 
the goal of school and business support and maintenance by the 
end of the period. The Academies are being implemented in 
phases. Seven "demonstration" academies were opened in the 
1993-94 academic year and two more in 1994-95. Twenty-one 
"expansion" academies were opened in 1994-95. Additionally, 
ten more academies will open in 1995-96. In fiscal 1994, $6.8 
million was budgeted for these programs. 
Military Training and Volunteerism; 
GuardCare - This pilot program aims to provide medical service 
to underserved populations. Army Reserve and Guard personnel 
conduct the program in partnership with states and often the 
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Public Health Service and costs are shared. In fiscal 1994 
more than 18,000 patients were seen and the program is 
currently established in 13 states (Alabama, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Washington). The military personnel and units receive actual 
training while attempting to heighten readiness for 
deployment. 
MERLIN - MERLIN is an acronym for Medical Readiness Learning 
Initiative. It is a computer simulation program aimed at 
increasing medical readiness skills for both wartime use and 
allowing military medical members to train and operate in the 
civilian medical community. MERLIN offers distance learning 
through access at any training center or medical unit via the 
Internet. 
CAREFORCE - CAREFORCE is a civil-military partnership 
providing a team approach to supporting the underserved 
population in inner-city trauma centers. Military medical 
personnel augment permanent staff in civilian hospitals to 
enhance disaster response capabilities. The military members 
are able to experience "real world" medical situations 
applicable to wartime readiness needs. 
Arch Anael - Arch Angel is scheduled for August 1995 and will 
involve personnel deployed to an inner-city area of St. Louis. 
It will be a Regional Interagency Contingency Training and 
Assessment Platform. While providing physical exams and 
immunizations in a medically underserved area, military 
medical personnel will be able to integrate with the civilian 
medical community trauma and casualty assets in an operational 
setting. Arch Angel will allow assessment of the success of 
the MERLIN and CAREFORCE programs in meeting readiness 
requirements. 
Reef-Ex - Reef-Ex is a DOD environmental project using the 
Army Material Command to create artificial offshore reefs. 
Obsolete battle tanks are prepared to meet Environmental 
Protection Agency standards, shipped to ports, and then placed 
on selected reef sites. The program placed 114 tanks off 
Alabama, Florida, and New Jersey in fiscal 1994 and nearly 
1,000 tanks will be used in fiscal 1995. DOD and states 
involved share project costs and Army personnel receive the 
benefit of actual training in vehicle inspection, preparation, 
maintenance, storage, and shipment. 
Operation KotzebueCare - This project has been initiated by 
the U.S. Marine Forces Reserve to provide dental health 
services to Native Alaskans. Roughly 1,600 inhabitants of 
three native villages in the Kotzebue region will benefit from 
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the mission to be conducted between February and March 1995. 
The service personnel will receive the experience of actual 
operations in a remote setting. 
Fourth Cliff Family Recreation Area - In the Boston, 
Massachusetts area, the Army Reserve, along with other Reserve 
and Active groups, is using volunteer service personnel to 
provide job skills training to disadvantaged 15-17 year old 
youths. The male and female participants will be able to 
learn carpentry, landscaping, painting and plumbing journeyman 
skills. The program is planned for nationwide introduction to 
assist more than a thousand young people during July and 
August 1995. 
Winslow - Winslow is an exercise involving the Army Reserve 
and the Winslow Indian Health Center (WIHC). The Army Reserve 
is providing a Deployable Medical Facility, personnel and 
equipment during a major renovation of the WIHC. During the 
course of Winslow, medical care for the Navajo nation will 
continue (WIHC serves more than 55,000 ambulatory patients a 
year) and reserve personnel will gain the benefit of 
conducting actual operations with a different culture while 
deployed to a remote location. . Winslow is scheduled to 
continue for six to nine months into fiscal 1995. 
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APPENDIX  D. 
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Source:  Adapted from Marjorie Ann Brown, "United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations 1988-1993: Background Information," Congressional 
Research Service Report 93-993F, 1993 and Marjorie Ann Brown, 
"United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Issues for 
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Provide Hope      Fmr Soviet Union 
35035  Provide Promise        Bosnia 
8805  Provide Transition     Angola 
Provide Relief Somalia 
13500 Hurricane Andrew       Florida 
70 med transport of Chernobyl children 
750 Typhoon Omar Guam 
8600 Hurricane Iniki        Hawaii 
974  Impressive Lift       Pakistan 
96  NEO Liberia 
21  NEO Tajikistan 
relief supplies       Armenia 
— flood relief Pakistan 
51431 Restore Hope Somalia 
930 Provide Refuge       Kwajalein 
254 peacekeepers Cambodia 
334  UNPROFOR Macedonia 
141  flood relief Iowa/Illinois/Missouri 
— 3 Bailey bridges        Nepal 
400 Army Rangers to       Somalia 
— earthquake relief   Bombay, India 
1300 Army forces to        Somalia 
350  Nepalese peacekeepers to Somalia 
270  earthquake relief    Los Angeles 
U.S./Belgian personnel to Rwanda 
— Rwandan refugee aid to Tanzania 
— MRI to Chernobyl      Chernobyl 
11000  Support Hope       Uganda (Rwanda) 
Uphold/Maintain Democracy - Haiti 
flood relief Vladivostok 
Sapphire (uranium)    Kazakhstan 
Source:  Adapted from Air Mobility Command Office of Military Hi 
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